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Judicial Restraints on Illegal State
Violence: Israel and the United States
John T. Parry*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the role of courts in controlling state
violence in the United States and Israel. The Author considers
how U.S. federal courts should respond to illegal state violence
by comparing a U.S. Supreme Court case, City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, with a case decided by the Supreme Court of Israel,
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel. Part II
highlights the legal issues that were central to each court in
reaching a decision, including standing, the scope of equitable
discretion to craft remedies, and baseline attitudes towards
illegal government action. Part III examines the doctrines
discussed in Part II, and considers whether expanding or
altering these doctrines would strengthen the ability of U.S.
courts to respond to illegal state violence. In Part IV, the
Author examines the differences in .the roles and powers of the
U.S. and Israeli courts in an effort to address the relationshipof
U.S. and Israeli courts to state violence. The Author argues
that despite the greater formal power enjoyed by the U.S.
Supreme Court compared to the Israeli Supreme Court, the U.S.
Supreme Court may have less flexibility to enforce civil rights.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................

74

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I am
particularly grateful to Arthur Hellman, Andrea Hibbard, Jules Lobel, Tom Ross, and
Peter Shane, and to John Barrett, Surell Brady, John Burkoff, Martha Chamallas,
Vivian Curran, Bill Funk, Myriam Gilles, David Herring, Bill Luneberg, John Noble,
David Rossman, Doug Sylvester, and Welsh White for their comments, thoughts, and
assistance. I also benefitted from the comments of participants in the Second Global
Conference: Perspectives on Evil and Human Wickedness and faculty workshops at the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, from the financial assistance of Dean's
Summer Scholarship Grants from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and from
the research of Todd Brown, Kuyomars Golparvar, and Sarah Shannon. Copyright
2002 John T. Parry.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

74

LYONS AND PUBLIC COMMITTEE....................................
ILLEGAL STATE VIOLENCE AND LEGAL DOCTRINE .........

II.
III.

A.
B.
C.
IV.

[VOL. 35:73

S tanding.............................................................
Equitable Discretion and the Preference
for Dam ages .........................................................
Baseline Attitudes toward Government
Violence: The No-RestraintRule ........................

81
94
95
108
122

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DOCTRINAL CHANGE IN
ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES ...................................

139

C ONCLUSION ...................................................................

148

V.

I. INTRODUCTION

Governments are often violent, and one of law's many functions
is to regulate the state's use of violence to maintain social order.'
Sometimes, however, state actors wield unauthorized or illegal
violence, with the frequent result that people die or suffer serious
2

injuries.
The primary responsibility for controlling illegal state violence in
this country lies with the legislative and executive branches. When,
for example, state and local authorities helped foster violent
resistance to desegregation and other advances in civil rights, they
were effectively resisted only through the forceful interventions of the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.3 More generally, the

1.
See generally Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601
(1986); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Introduction, in LAW'S VIOLENCE 1-4 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992); Robert Weisberg, Private Violence as Moral
Action: The Law as Inspiration and Example, in LAW's VIOLENCE at 175-78. This
seems an appropriate place to note that this Article is concerned with state violenceand in particular illegal or questionably legal state violence, see infra note 2-in the
form of physical actidns that cause pain and other physical, mental, or emotional
harms, and not with violence as a metaphor for or description of law, legal practice, or
judging in general.
2.
Illegal state violence is violence that is contrary to a statute or the
Constitution, and this Article argues that unauthorized state violence should be illegal
as well. Caselaw, however, appears to hold that the Constitution neither requires
legislative authorization as a precondition to the use of state violence nor allows a
remedy that would adequately restrain illegal state violence. See, e.g., text at infra
notes 43-58, 223-35. As a result, and at the risk of appearing tendentious, I have
substituted the term "illegal state violence" for "excessive force" in most of this article
because of the former's greater scope and the latter's link to current constitutional
doctrine.
3.
Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 949, 968, 968 n.69 (1978). For a narrative account, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63 (1988).
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willingness of executive officials to restrain themselves and their
4
peers is a crucial component of the effort to manage state violence.
For its part, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide legal
and equitable relief for violations of civil rights under color of state
law. More recently, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which
authorizes the Department of Justice (DOJ) to seek injunctive relief
against patterns or practices of law enforcement conduct that violate
civil rights. 5 Section 14141 is an important tool, but it leaves
individuals dependent upon the energy, resources, and timeliness of
the federal executive branch for equitable relief, and perhaps for this
6
reason has been applied in only a few instances since its enactment.
7
While improvements in the statute or its enforcement are possible,

4.
Put differently, courts are not the only government actors who interpret the
law, and rule of law ideals mean little if they are not embraced by executive officials.
Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The
Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 485-92
(1987).
5.
Section 14141 responds to cases such as United States v. City of
Philadelphia,644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980), which held that "the United States may not
sue to enjoin violations of individuals' fourteenth amendment rights without specific
statutory authority." Id. at 201-02. City of Philadelphia grew out of the Supreme
Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), which rejected individual and
class standing to sue the Philadelphia police for. equitable relief. The Justice
Department conducted its own investigation, substantiated the gist of the claims made
in Rizzo, and brought suit. See City of Philadelphia,644 F.2d at 207-08 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
6.
Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing
Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1404-12
(2000) (discussing use of § 14141 against the Columbus, Pittsburgh, and Steubenville
police and investigations of other police departments, and assessing the statute's
efficacy) [hereinafter Gilles, Reinventing]; Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity:
The Case of FederalRegulation of Intellectual Property,53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1362-64
(2001) (doubting the federal government's ability adequately to enforce individual
private rights); Todd S. Purdum, Los Angeles Agrees to Changes ForPolice, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2000, at A18 (describing agreement between Los Angeles and DOJ to address
"what the Justice Department has called a systemic pattern of abusive conduct by
officers here"); Kevin Flynn, Wild Card in Police Oversight Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2000, at B3 (noting New York City has been negotiating with DOJ over a consent
decree to end a § 14141 investigation); U.S. Dep't of Justice, 'Civil Rights Division,
Special Litigation Section, Documents and Publications, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crtl
split/findsettle.htm (collecting § 14141 consent decrees).
7.
See, e.g., Gilles, Reinventing, supra note 6, at 1417-18 (proposing deputizing
aggrieved individuals to bring suit on behalf of the federal government). Analogizing to
qui tam suits, Professor Gilles suggests courts might find standing in such
circumstances. Id. at 1421-24, 1445-49; Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing:
U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 36467 (2001) [hereinafter Gilles, Representational]. Her proposal suggests important new
ways for Congress to ensure adequate civil rights enforcement. If the Court, however,
views such an amendment as an effort to undermine its constitutional decision in
Lyons, the statute could be in peril under City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992) (suggesting
Congress cannot use citizen suits to overcome constitutional standing requirements);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on
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§ 1983 continues to provide the primary vehicle for individual
challenges to government action.
The role of federal courts in controlling state violence consists
largely of deciding cases brought under statutes passed by
Congress-again, § 1983 is the primary example. On occasion,
however, federal courts have looked beyond statutes to create
remedies for illegal conduct by government officials. For example,
the Bivens doctrine creates a cause of action directly under the
Constitution for violations by federal officials of constitutional
rights. 8 The doctrine of Ex parte Young allows claims for prospective
injunctive relief against government officials charged with carrying
out allegedly unconstitutional laws or policies. 9
In the course of applying § 1983, federal courts have had to
interpret the words of the statute1 ° and in particular have had to
determine how it interacts with traditional doctrines of remedies and
official immunity, as well as how principles of federalism impact its
scope. The Supreme Court has adopted doctrines of absolute and
qualified immunity for state officers-and federal officers sued under
Bivens-that prevent many injured plaintiffs from obtaining relief."
The Court also has limited the scope of equitable remedies because of
federalism concerns. One of the central cases in this latter effort is
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 12 which declared that § 1983 plaintiffs
must establish standing to seek injunctive relief over and above their
standing to seek damages and established that the irreparable injury
rule, supported by principles of federalism, bars injunctive relief in

the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-35, 48-56 (1984) [hereinafter
Fallon, Public Law] (arguing pre-Lujan and Boerne that Congress could legislate
around Lyons). For a discussion of the complexity and potential intrusiveness of §
14141 consent decrees, see infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
8.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403

U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens has been limited in cases such as Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296 (1983), which refused to allow a Bivens action in the military context where
statutory remedies were available.
9.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) (holding the Ex parte Young doctrine is limited to suits for prospective
injunctive relief); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996)
(holding remedies created by Congress can displace the Exparte Young doctrine).
10.
For example, the Supreme Court repeatedly has grappled with the meaning
of the word "person" in § 1983. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding
cities are not "persons"); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding
cities are "persons"); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (suggesting states are not
"persons"); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding states are
not "persons").
11.
See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223-29 (1988) (describing absolute
immunity); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (holding immunity doctrines apply
to Bivens actions as well as § 1983 actions); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(adopting qualified immunity from suit for most officials); see also Richardson v.
McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (holding private parties who act as agents of states
cannot claim qualified immunity); infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
12.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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most § 1983 cases. As a result of Lyons, § 1983 plaintiffs cannot
obtain injunctions unless they can prove that they or members of a
class of similarly situated people are suffering a continuing injury or
face a definite, imminent, and personal threat of future injury. 13 The
same standing requirements apply to claims against federal officials.
Even as federal courts have crafted doctrines that restrict civil
rights claims, our federal and state governments have continued to
employ illegal violence, all too often against minorities or those who
in some way are on the margins of our society. 1 4 The vast majority of
law enforcement officials perform their duties without using
unnecessary or illegal violence, and it is a simple fact that the police
must use violence to do their jobs properly and effectively. The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York City and
Washington, D.C. underscore in extreme fashion the risks faced by
law enforcement officials and the need to ensure that they have
adequate tools to counter violent crime.
Nonetheless, persistent reports of illegal or questionably legal
police violence suggest that it continues at an unacceptably high
level. Among the most prominent incidents are:

13.
See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND
PRACTICE 552 (2001) ("Lyons ... makes it virtually impossible for the victim of police
abuse to secure injunctive relief against a local government entity for practices of its
police or sheriffs department."); Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial
Review, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 501 n.172 (1997) (arguing Lyons "has proved
an almost insurmountable barrier to prospective relief in most police cases"). See also 1
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983, 5-27-5-40 (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001) (collecting cases applying Lyons,
the vast majority of which denied standing to seek injunctions); Gilles, Reinventing,
supra note 6, at 1399 n.57 (similarly collecting cases applying Lyons); Laura E. Little,
It's About Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 933,
941-46 (1993) (arranging another collection of cases applying Lyons). But see Brandon
Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1820-26 (2000) (arguing Lyons requires only a "credible threat" of
future harm and collecting cases in which courts found such a threat).
14.
See SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
CRIME IN AMERICA 85-108 (1996) (exploring the disproportionate impact of police
violence on minority groups, particularly African American males); Susan Bandes,
Patternsof Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1281 n.35
(2000) (noting the poor and minorities are most likely to suffer from police violence);
Amnesty International, United States of America: A Briefing for the UN Committee
Against Torture 7 (May 2000) [hereinafter Amnesty International, Torture],
http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/indexAMR510562000.htm ("There is evidence that
racial minorities are disproportionately the victims of police ill-treatment .... Mentally
ill and homeless people are also frequently the victims of police abuse. Gays and
lesbians have been subjected to harassment or brutality in some areas."); Coalition
Against Torture and Racial Discrimination, Torture in the United States 5 (Oct. 1998),
http://www.udayton.edu/-race/06internat/torture01.htm
(noting "special problems
related to abusive treatment of detainees and experienced by those seeking asylum
status" in the United States).
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the shooting of an unarmed, fleeing African American man
15
by Cincinnati police;
corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department that
16
included the intentional shooting of a man in handcuffs;
the Louisville police department's decision to reward two
officers who shot an unarmed African American man
17
twenty-two times;
corruption in the Miami police department that included
the intentional shooting of three unarmed men; 18 and
a spate of killings of unarmed or mentally ill individuals by
New York City police. 19

15.
Cincinnati Officer Acquitted in Killing that Ignited Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2001, at A18 (describing shooting by police of fleeing 19-year-old whose record
consisted of outstanding traffic and flight warrants).
16.
Los Angeles Settles Lawsuit Against Police, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at
A20 (describing $15 million settlement "to a man who said police officers shot him in
the head and chest and then framed him in the attack."); James Sterngold, Los Angeles
Police Officials Admit Widespread Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A16 (noting
"more than 40 criminal cases have been or will shortly be overturned" because of police
corruption including unlawful violence); James Sterngold, Police Corruption Inquiry
Expands in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A16 (reporting Los Angeles
police "shot an unarmed man in handcuffs, planted guns, drugs and other evidence on
suspects, lied in court testimony to frame innocent people and stole drugs and money").
See also New Oversight of Police Urged in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at
A21 (reporting conclusions of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky in a study requested by the
Los Angeles Police Protective League that "[ain environment in which excessive force
and a code of silence was tolerated has allowed corruption to fester"); Don Terry,
Rackets Law Can Be Used Against Police in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at
A14 (reporting a federal judge has allowed a civil RICO suit to go forward against the
LAPD). The scope of the most recent LAPD corruption scandal may not be as broad as
some have claimed, but the LAPD's overall record of illegal violence remains poor.
Peter J. Boyer, Bad Cops, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2001, at 60. For an additional recent
incident, see Los Angeles Board Rules Police Shooting Was Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2000, § 1, at 22 (describing fatal shooting by police of a fifty-four year-old mentally ill
homeless woman who brandished a foot long screwdriver when two officers approached
her and asked whether she had stolen the shopping cart that she was using).
17.
Francis X. Clines, Protesting by Angry Police Leaves Louisville Unsettled,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A12. When the mayor fired the police chief for giving the
awards, officers "deserted their beats" to protest at city hall. Id. "[S]houting officers
cut off downtown traffic and left the lights on their cruisers flashing ominously outside
the seat of government as they called for the mayor's ouster." Id.
18.
Dana Canedy, 11 Miami Officers Facing U.S. Charges in 3 Shooting Deaths,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2001, at Al (describing shooting by police of three unarmed men in
separate incidents, followed by planting of weapons and claims that the men were
armed).
19.
Amnesty International, Torture, supra note 14, at 8 (describing shooting by
NYPD of Amadou Diallo and officers' subsequent acquittal on criminal charges); John
Kifner, No Charges Against Officers in Fatal Brooklyn Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1999, at B1 (describing shooting by NYPD of hammer-wielding mentally ill man after a
brief altercation); Eric Lipton, Guiliani Cites Criminal Past of Slain Man: Pressed on
Shooting, Mayor Criticizes Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at B1 (describing
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for the task of combating illegal state violence in the United States.
The Supreme Court of Israel operates within a social and legal
context that is different enough from that of the United States to
prevent an easy transfer of doctrines-although I argue that U.S.
courts should think seriously about some of these doctrines.
Moreover, Public Committee is a complex decision, and aspects of it
may turn out to be unworkable for U.S. courts. Finally, the realities
of state violence-legal or illegal-in Israel are far different from
those in the United States, even after September 11. Frequent
terrorism, the renewed intifada, and the government's responses to
these events make clear that the role of Israeli courts in managing
state violence of any kind is limited and precarious-although the
same is also true to some degree in the United States. Yet even with
these caveats, Public Committee suggests methods and doctrines for
putting into practice at the most basic level the ideal of law as a
23
constraint on arbitrary government power.
Part II of this Article describes the decisions in Lyons and Public
Committee and highlights the legal issues that were central to each
court: standing, the scope of equitable discretion to craft remedies,
and the proper baseline attitude toward illegal government action.
Part III examines these three doctrines in depth and considers
whether expanded standing, greater ,equitable discretion and
reconsideration of the preference for damages, and, most
significantly, a rule of no restraints on liberty without explicit
legislative authorization would strengthen the ability of U.S. courts
to respond to illegal state violence.
I argue that the federalism and separation of powers concerns
that animate much of standing doctrine-and in particular the Lyons
doctrine of limited injunction-standing-can be addressed by courts
at the remedies stage of litigation. In addition, a fair evaluation of
the inadequacies of damages in civil rights cases supports a greater
role for injunctions. Injunctions, however, are no panacea, and many
of the federalism and separation of powers concerns about overly
intrusive federal court injunctions have considerable force.
To
accommodate these views, I propose adoption of the Israeli doctrine
prohibiting unauthorized force. In addition to damages awards in
private-plaintiff civil rights cases, courts should issue injunctions

23.
Although this Article compares decisions of the U.S. and Israeli supreme
courts, it is not "comparative" in the strong sense. See Vivian Grosswald Curran,

Cultural Immersion, Difference, and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 43 (1998) [hereinafter Curran, Cultural Immersion] (arguing comparative
analysis requires immersion in the legal culture to be studied but with the awareness
that immersion may lead to findings of difference rather than commonality). I will
offer an interpretation of Public Committee, but I am no expert on Israeli law, politics,
or society. My primary goal is to use the case to gain critical perspective on U.S. law
and practice, not to provide a definitive explanation of Public Committee and its place
in Israeli law.
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These examples, while not exhaustive, provide sufficient evidence of
20
the ongoing problem of illegal state violence in the United States.
In addition, the September 11 attacks increase the chances that
federal officials will engage in illegal or unauthorized violence. For
example, federal officials have considered the use of physical force in
the interrogation of those suspected of participating in the September
11 attacks. 2 1 More generally, recent events could lead to vastly
increased claims of executive branch discretion and inherent law
enforcement authority.
This Article considers how federal courts could better respond to
claims challenging state violence, particularly claims that are linked
to the problem of excessive executive discretion. I approach this issue
by comparing the decision in Lyons with the Supreme Court of
Israel's recent decision-sitting as the High Court of Justice-in
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel,22 which
prohibited the illegal torture of suspected terrorists. I have chosen
this comparison because the two cases exhibit different approaches to
the problem of controlling illegal state violence. Lyons strongly
suggests that individuals have no enforceable right to be free of
illegal state violence, while Public Committee takes such a right as a
premise and enforces it.
My focus, therefore, is whether and to what extent Public
Committee should serve as a model for doctrinal change in the United
States. I do not, however, claim that Israel presents an ideal model

shooting by undercover officers of unarmed man after scuffle that began when the
victim rebuffed the officers' efforts to involve him in a drug sting). See also Dan Barry,
Officer's Silence Still Thwarting Torture Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997, at Al
(describing torture of Abner Louima by NYPD officers); Kevin Flynn, How to Sue the
Police (and Win): Lawyers Share Trade Secrets of a Growth Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 1999, at Bl (describing conference on litigating police misconduct cases in New
York City, where "2,600 citizens accuse the police of misbehavior every year").
20.
For other examples of recent police violence in these and other cites, see
Bandes, supra note 14, at 1306-07; Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV.
1107, 1112-17, 1146-48 (2000); David Kocieniewski, Charges Dismissed in Shooting
Case Against Trooper, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at Al (describing dismissal of charges
against officers who killed three unarmed men during traffic stop); Amtrak Police Kill
Man at Philadelphia Station, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2000, at A21 (describing fatal
shooting by police of homeless man who threw a chair at them); Tamar Lewin, Images
of Police Beatings are Subject to Blurring,N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at Al.
21.
See Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilenna,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6. See also Alan M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous
Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, pt. 2 at 19 (proposing judges should be able
to issue "torture warrants"); Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps Into Discussion by News
Media, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at Cl; Steven Lee Myers & Neil A. Lewis, Rumsfeld
Offers Assurances About Use of Military Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at B10
(noting a former deputy attorney general argued "it might also be permissible to
transfer terriorist suspects to other nations with different standards of interrogation").
22.
H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel
(Sept. 6, 1999), available at http://207.232.15.136/mishpat/html/en/system/index.html,
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).
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against restraints on liberty that were not approved in advance by a
legislature or, in narrow circumstances, a regulatory entity. These
injunctions would essentially throw the underlying dispute back into
the democratic process for resolution-with, of course, the potential
for substantive judicial review of the constitutionality of any
resulting rules.
Although doctrine is important, Lyons and Public Committee
also reflect larger differences in the roles and powers of U.S. and
Israeli courts. I argue in Part IV that we should acknowledge the
possible unfortunate consequences for civil rights plaintiffs of the
U.S. Supreme Court's formal power, as well as the greater flexibility
to enforce civil rights enjoyed by the formally less powerful Supreme
Court of Israel. Despite its power, the U.S. Supreme Court is
unlikely-and may perhaps be afraid-to adopt something like the
Israeli no-restraint rule in wholesale fashion. An incremental,
common-law-style approach offers the best opportunity for
meaningful doctrinal change.
The organization of this Article reflects its two-fold purpose.
Parts II and III are relatively straightforward analyses of Lyons and
Public Committee, of the doctrinal differences between them, and of
whether it is desirable as a matter of doctrine to move from Lyons
toward Public Committee. While I believe this analysis is important,
my strong sense is that it is insufficient on its own. My discussion of
judicial review and doctrinal change in Part IV is a more frankly
speculative effort to address the relationship of courts to state
violence. This final section thus exists not as a last word but as a
half step, a set of ruminations about how better to energize U.S.
courts to restrain illegal state violence.

II. LYONS AND PUBLIC COMMITTEE
Officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) pulled
Adolph Lyons over for the traffic offense of having a burned-out tail
light. 24 Although Lyons, an African American, cooperated with the
officers, they drew their guns when they confronted him, slammed his
hands against his head, and applied a chokehold after he complained.
Lyons lost consciousness, urinated and defecated on himself, and was
left gasping for breath and spitting up blood. 25 The police issued a
26
traffic citation and released him.

24.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97 (1983).
25.
Id. at 115 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. The majority's presentation of the facts is consistent but shorter. Id. at
26.
97-98 (majority opinion). For a detailed description of chokeholds and the injuries they
cause, see id. at 115-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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No elected body had specifically authorized the LAPD to use
chokeholds. 2 7 Moreover, the precise nature of the LAPD's policy was
unclear and disputed. 28 An LAPD training officer characterized
department policy as authorizing a police officer "to deploy a
chokehold whenever he 'feels that there's about to be a bodily attack
made on him.' 29 The City claimed that LAPD policy required
"officers to use only that force which is 'reasonable and necessary' and
the minimal force required to overcome resistance," but also said that
chokeholds could be used "upon resisting, attacking (typically
weaponless), or fleeing suspects. '30 Lyons relied on depositions and
LAPD documents to argue that the LAPD
authorized strangleholds in a wide variety of situations where neither
life nor serious bodily injury was threatened. Officers were permitted
to use strangleholds whenever a police officer 'felt' there was about to
be a bodily attack on him; to subdue any resistance by suspects, to
overcome or subdue combative suspects, and 'when necessary to stop a
31
suspect's resistance.

From February 1975 to July 1980, "LAPD officers applied
chokeholds on at least 975 occasions, which represented more than
three-quarters of the reported altercations" between police and
suspects. 32
Sixteen people-twelve of them African American
males-died from LAPD chokeholds between February 1975 and May
1982. 33 Many others probably suffered injuries similar to or worse

27.
Id. at 99 (majority opinion).
28.
Id. at 110 ("there has been no occasion to determine the precise contours of
the city's chokehold policy"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in
Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1273 (1989)
("because the case was in the preliminary injunction phase, the Court did not know the
agency's policy").
29.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 118 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 110 n.9
(majority opinion).
30.
Brief for the City of Los Angeles at 5, 6, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983) (No. 81-1064).
31.
Brief for Respondent at 17-18, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983) (No. 81-1064).
32.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing testimony of the
"officer-in-charge of the Physical Training and Self-Defense Unit of the LAPD").
33.
Id. at 99, 100 (majority opinion); id. at 116-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
African American males were nine percent of Los Angeles's population at the time. Id.
at 116 n.3. According to information the Author obtained from the California
Department of Justice's Criminal Statistics Center, of the 198,373 people arrested for
felonies and misdemeanors (including misdemeanor traffic offenses) by the LAPD in
1980, 72,143 (36.37%) were African American. Of the 61,964 felony arrestees, 29,892
(48.24%) were African American. For all of Los Angeles County, African Americans
were 138,760 (27.68%) of the 501,320 felony and misdemeanor arrestees, and 60,369
(39.64%) of the 152,370 felony arrestees. Due to racial bias, these rates of arrest
probably overstate the rates of criminality of African Americans and other groups
relative to whites. Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists,
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 792 (1994)
(citing Developments in the Law--Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV.
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than those suffered by Lyons. 34 During this period, the Board of
Police Commissioners, whose members were appointed by the mayor
and confirmed by the city council, studied the LAPD's use of
chokeholds and concluded there were "no suitable alternatives" to
their use. 35 After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, the
Los Angeles Chief of Police prohibited one of the two types of
of Police Commissioners imposed a
chokehold and the Board
36
moratorium on the other.
Lyons brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages,
declaratory relief, and an injunction barring the use of chokeholds by
the LAPD. 37 In his complaint, Lyons alleged that LAPD officers
"regularly and routinely apply these choke holds in innumerable
situations where they are not threatened by the use of any deadly
force whatsoever," in violation of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 38 The district court
found that "without provocation or legal justification the officers
involved had applied a 'Department-authorized chokehold which
resulted in injuries to the plaintiff.'' 39 Concluding that the LAPD
authorized chokeholds "in situations where no one is threatened by
death or grievous bodily harm,"40 the court entered a preliminary
injunction enjoining the use of chokeholds absent such a threat and
requiring improved training and record-keeping. 41 The Ninth Circuit
42
affirmed.

1473, 1508 (1988)). In any event, the disparity between the percentage of African
American arrestees and the percentage of African Americans among those killed by
chokeholds is suggestive.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 115-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the
34.
predictable consequences of chokeholds).
Brief for the City of Los Angeles at 8, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
35.
95 (1983) (No. 81-1064). The city council also conducted an investigation. Id.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 100 (majority opinion). Because the LAPD could resume
36.
using chokeholds, the Court rejected Lyons's claim that these changes mooted the case.
Thus, the moratorium on chokeholds should have had no impact on the Court's
conclusion that Lyons's fear of future injury was too speculative to support standing.
37.
Id. at 97, 112-13.
38.
Id. at 98.
39.
Id. at 99.
40.
Id.
Id. at 100.
41.
Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
42.
The court found no abuse of discretion and described the preliminary injunction as a
relatively innocuous interference by the judiciary with police practice ... when
the record reveals that nine suspects who have been stopped by the police and
who have been subdued by the use of carotid and bar arm control holds have
subsequently died, allegedly of the injuries sustained in the application of these
holds. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) (federal court may not order
sweeping structural relief requiring federal court supervision of state police
procedures absent "extraordinary circumstances").
Id. at 417-18.
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The Supreme Court reversed. The Court ruled that while Lyons
presumably had standing to seek damages, "a plaintiff must
demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought." 43 Lyons's
standing to seek an injunction, according to the Court, "depended
upon whether he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of
chokeholds by police."'4 4 The Court determined that Lyons could not
make a "realistic" claim to that effect unless he could show that all
members of the LAPD always apply chokeholds when arresting,
questioning or issuing a citation, or that "the City ordered or
authorized police to act in such manner. '45 The Court concluded that
allegations of this nature by Lyons would be mere "conjecture" and
"speculation." 46
Put another way, the Court rejected Lyons's claim because he
was unlikely to suffer another chokehold under any reasonably
conceivable department policy. The Court appears to have accepted
Lyons's allegation "that the City authorized the use of the control
holds in situations where deadly force was not threatened" 4 7-in
other words, that the LAPD had a policy of allowing chokeholds in
such situations-and the district court so found. 48 The Supreme
Court observed, however, that this allegation "is not equivalent to the
unbelievable assertion that the City either orders or authorizes
application of chokeholds where there is no resistance or other
provocation" and that such an allegation "is belied by the record
made on the application for preliminary injunction. '4 9 The Court
later characterized the LAPD's policy as prohibiting chokeholds
"absent some resistance or other provocation by the arrestee or other
suspect,"50 but then equated that policy with allowing chokeholds
"when the officer 'feels' or believes there is about to be a bodily
attack."51 The Court's language suggests that a policy of using
deadly force against citizens based on an officer's feelings or beliefs is
immune from equity. Yet such a policy would be in some tension
with the constitutional ban on the use of deadly force against fleeing
suspects absent probable cause to believe the suspect "poses a threat
of serious physical harm. '52 Whether actions under such a policy

43.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109.
44.
Id. at 105.
45.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108. The Court also ruled that Lyons's "assertion that he may again
46.
be subject to an illegal chokehold does not create the actual controversy that must exist
for a declaratory judgment to be entered." Id. at 104.
47.
Id. at 106.
See id. at 99.
48.
Id. at 106 n.7.
49.
50.
Id. at 110.
51.
Id. at 110 n.9.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). The Garner Court stated that
52.
the use of deadly force to prevent an escape was permissible "if the suspect threatens
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satisfy the objective reasonableness standard for claims of excessive
force during an arrest is unclear. 53
Because Lyons had no standing, the Court did not consider the
merits of his claim. 54 The Court, however, took pains to explain that
even if Lyons had standing, he could not have shown the irreparable
injury or lack of an adequate remedy at law that are prerequisites to
injunctive relief.5 5 The Court said that "Lyons is no more entitled to
an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles" 5f 6 and declared
that "the need for a proper balance between state and federal
authority" requires "restraint" in the use of injunctions "to oversee
state law enforcement authorities." 57 The Court also asserted that
the availability of after-the-fact damages and criminal sanctions is a
sufficient deterrent against violent deprivations of, constitutional
rights. 58
While the facts of Lyons are appalling, its holdings stand
comfortably on the foundation of Rizzo v. Goode,59 O'Shea v.
Littleton,6 0 and Younger v.Harris,61 all of which limited the scope of
equitable relief under § 1983. True, Lyons can be distinguished on its
facts and legal posture,6 2 and the case certainly extended standing
doctrine by "fragmenting" cases into separate claims, each of which

the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm ... and
if, where feasible, some warning has been given." Id. at 11-12. Cf. Pierce, supra note
28, at 1273 n.206 ("Apparently, the [Lyon.s] majority would hold that the agency's
stated policy falls within constitutional boundaries").
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989) (holding objective
53.
reasonableness is the proper standard for excessive force claims); see also Saucier v.
Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2001) ("If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed
that a suspect was likely to fight back .. .the officer would be justified in using more
force than in fact was needed.").
Two years later, the Court accepted part of the basic theory of liability that
54.
Lyons had urged. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; Steven L. Winter, The

Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1375
(1988).
55.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.
56. - Id.
57.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
58.
59.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (finding no case or controversy in civil
rights action seeking injunction against widespread police misconduct and specifically
criticizing the district court's decision to order the police department to draft internal
policies as a remedy for civil rights violations); see supra note 5.
O'Shea v. Littleon, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (finding no case or controversy in
60.
civil rights action seeking injunction against discriminatory police practices).
61.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (limiting federal court ability to
enjoin state criminal proceedings). For additional cases limiting standing or requiring
abstention prior to Lyons, see Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 35-36, 69.
See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. 123-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fallon, Public
62.
Law, supra note 7, at 36-39 (distinguishing earlier cases as resting on inadequate
allegations of causation); id. at 44 (distinguishing earlier cases as seeking more
sweeping relief).
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requires an independent standing inquiry. 63 Lyons, however, is
consistent with the attitudes that animate Younger, O'Shea, and
Rizzo, chief among them the reluctance to "circumscribe the authority
64
of the wielders of state violence.
Still, the path to Lyons was not inevitable. In Allee v. Medrano,
the Court rejected Article III and federalism-based objections to the
entry of an injunction against a "persistent" but discontinued
"pattern of police misconduct" that destroyed the efforts of
Allee suggested an approach to
farmworkers to unionize. 6 5
justiciability that had historical support 66 and would have made more

63.
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("a
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought') (citing
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 122 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fallon, Public
Law, supra note 7, at 22 n.115 (describing precedents on the meaning of "case" that
undermine the analysis in Lyons); id. at 24-25 (suggesting prior cases, including Rizzo
and O'Shea, may have rested as much on mootness as on standing); Linda E. Fisher,
Caging Lyons: The Availability of Injunctive Relief in Section 1983 Actions, 18 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1085 (1987) (arguing Lyons extended previous doctrine).
64.
Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos]. See also Fallon,
Public Law, supra note 7, at 43 (arguing Lyons imposes "heavy costs" as "a solution to
the problems of public law litigation"); id. at 71 ("Lyons's principal significance for the
doctrine of equitable restraint may lie in its failure to interrupt the self-enforcing
momentum of 'Our Federalism'); Daniel J. Meltzer, DeterringConstitutionalViolations
by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 319-20 (1988) (noting "[t]he slogan of federalism ... leads to
the total denial of judicial redress (state or federal) for the violation of federal rights");
Winter, supra note 54, at 1381 ("All too often, the inevitable consequence of a decision
denying standing is 'that the most injurious and widespread government actions c[an]
be questioned by nobody."').
65.
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S, 802, 815 (1974). See also Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939) (upholding an injunction preventing police from illegally disrupting
labor activities).
66.
Standing doctrine as such did not exist until after the drafting of Article III,
and some version of public law litigation was well-established in the founding era. See
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 300-01 (1979) ("The practice at the
time the Constitution was written was ... both more restrictive and more lenient than
at present."); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961) (describing the history of British and American public
actions and arguing they were well-established in the United States by an early date);

Evan Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability: The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REV. 603, 637-41 (1992) (summarizing evidence about the meaning of "cases"
and "controversies" and finding little proof that the framers understood these words to
include modern-day notions of justiciability); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist'Approach,81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 402, 426,
436-37, 483 (1996) (reaching similar conclusions); Peter M. Shane, Returning
Separation of Powers to Its Normative Roots: The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions
and Other Private Suits to Enforce Civil Fines, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11081, 11082-89
(2000) (surveying the history of standing doctrine to reach similar conclusions and
suggesting how the court went off track) [hereinafter Shane, Returning]; Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 178 (1992) ("There is absolutely no affirmative evidence that Article
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room for the use of equity to control official discretion to employ
violence. Moreover, we could link Allee to the underlying goals of
public law litigation to argue for a more relaxed standing test.6 7 The
declining era of public law litigation, however, provides little traction
against the Court's current, overriding concern for safeguarding
federalism and executive discretion. 68 The theme that emerges from

Lyons and its predecessors-with Allee reminding us of the path not
taken-is that government officials sometimes abuse their power, but
so long as they pay for the damage, we must accept it and move on.
Lyons thus suggests a world in which illegal state violence is a fact of
life over which judges have little control-perhaps because the
political process is said to be the appropriate forum for further
remedies 69-except for their limited power to hear damages claims or
preside over criminal prosecutions.
What then are we to make of the Supreme Court of Israel's
decision in Public Committee?
Six Palestinians suspected of
involvement in terrorist activities were tortured by Israel's General

Security Service-GSS, also known as Shin Bet. 70

The methods of

torture included:

III was intended to limit congressional power to create standing. There is no
affirmative evidence of a requirement of a 'personal stake' or an 'injury in fact'-beyond
the genuine requirement that some source of law confer a cause of action.") [hereinafter
Sunstein, What's Standing]; Winter, supra note 54, at 1394-1457 (arguing standing
limits on public rights litigation are a recent phenomenon and suggesting alternatives
to contemporary doctrine). But see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English
Prerogative Writs: The Original Understanding, BROOK. L. REV. 1001 (1997) (arguing
earlier writers, including Jaffe, seriously misunderstood British practice and
contending there is little evidence of public actions in England). For additional
discussion of this history, see infra note 142.
67.
See Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 39-47; Winter, supra note 54.
68.
For a brief history of public law litigation, see Gilles, Reinventing, supra
note 6, at 1389-99. See also Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7 (assessing the Court's
then-emerging hostility to public law litigation).
69.
See Meltzer, supra note 64, at 287-89, 299-300 (suggesting flaws in the
claim that the political process will provide adequate remedies for official misconduct).
70.
Throughout this Article, I describe the interrogation practices at issue in
Public Committee as "torture"-a description I believe is amply warranted. See ELAINE
SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 47-48 (1985)
(describing how even ordinary movements or postures qualify as torture when
prolonged); see also Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report-Was the
Security Service Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the "Needs" of-the Security
Service?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 216, 250 (1989) ("A cold shower may be commonplace .. , but it
can be degrading treatment when forced upon a person as a means of breaking down
his resistance."); see infra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing fatalities from
Israeli interrogations). The court, however, never used "torture" to describe these
practices. See, e.g., H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State
of Israel (Sept. 6, 1999), available at http://207.232.15.136/mishpat/html/en/system
index.html, at 3-4, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999) (using the terms "physical
means," "pressure methods," and "physical force"). The court only used "torture" when
describing the claims and arguments of the parties; see id. at 5, 8, 9, or when making
general observations, such as "a reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of
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"the forceful shaking of the suspect's upper torso, back and
forth, repeatedly, in a manner which causes the neck and
71
head to dangle and vacillate rapidly";
the "Shabach position," which involves a suspect seated in a
chair that is tilted forward, with one arm between his back
and the chair, and the other arm against the outside of the
a
chair, his hands then tied together, his head covered by
72
sack, and subjected to loud music for a prolonged period;
the "frog crouch," which involves forcing suspects to crouch
73
on their toes for five minute intervals;
intentional tightening of handcuffs to cause pain and
swelling; 74 and
sleep deprivation associated with the Shabach position and
75
with prolonged interrogation.
During the 1987-1994 period, between sixteen and twenty-five
76
Palestinians died after being subjected to similar treatment.
As in Lyons, no elected body had specifically authorized these
practices. In 1987, however, a commission chaired by Moshe Landau,
former president of the Supreme Court of Israel, examined the GSS's

torture, free of cruel, inhuman treatment of the subject and free of any degrading
handling whatsoever." Id. at 16.
Id. at 6.
71.
72.
ld. at 7.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 7-8.
75.
Id. at 8. Amnesty International claims Israel has also "forced [suspects] to
stand hand-cuffed to a wall . .. or tied up in some other painful position (like the
'banana', in which the body is bent backwards by tying up hands to feet) for prolonged
periods," with "beatings all over the body, sometimes concentrated on sensitive areas
such as the genitals, and prolonged confinement in closet-sized dark cells" that may be
"particularly cold or hot." Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories:
Torture and Ill-treatment of Political Detainees § II.B, at http://www.amnesty.orgl
ailib/aipub/1994JMDE/150394.MDE.txt (1994) [hereinafter Amnesty, Ill-treatment]. See
also Emmanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 89, 120-23 (2001) (providing further detail about Israeli interrogation
practices and GSS explanations for them); Catherine M. Grosso, Note, International
Law in the Domestic Arena: The Case of Torture in Israel, 86 IOWA L. REV. 305, 313-18
(2000) (describing Israeli interrogation practices prior to Public Committee); Israel,
Palestinians Reject Amnesty Criticism, DEUTSHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, June 16, 1999
(describing Israeli government response to Amnesty International's allegations); Israel
Rejects Amnesty Charges of Systematic Torture, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 7, 1994
(describing the same).
76.
See Amnesty, Ill-treatment, supra note 75, § IV.B. See also Amnesty
International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Oral Statement to the United
Nations, Commission on Human Rights on the Israeli Occupied Territories,2 (1997), at
http://msanews.mynet.netMSANEWS/199704/19970402.7.html ("In April 1995 'Abd alSamed Harizat, a Palestinian, violently shaken 12 times over a 12-hour period, fell into
a coma and died without regaining consciousness.").
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interrogation practices. 77 The Landau Commission report described
the interrogation of a suspected terrorist as "a difficult confrontation
between the vital need to discover all he knows, based on a wellfounded assumption, usually from classified sources, and the will of
the person interrogated to keep silent and conceal what he knows or
to mislead the interrogators by providing false information."7 8 The
Commission concluded that Israel's codified version of the necessity
defense authorizes in advance the use of force in interrogation, so
long as the interrogator reasonably believes the lesser evil of force is
necessary to get information that would prevent the greater evil of
loss of innocent lives:
To put it bluntly, the alternative is: are we to accept the offence of
assault entailed in slapping a suspect's face, or threatening him, in
order to induce him to talk and reveal a cache of explosive materials
meant for use in carrying out an act of mass terror against a civilian
population, and thereby prevent the greater evil which is about to
79
occur? The answer is self-evident.

The Landau Commission report generated controversy, but its
recommendations continued to provide the bureaucratic framework
80
for torture in Israel at the time Public Committee was decided.
According to the Public Committee court,

77.
Amnesty, Ill-treatment,supra note 75, § III.B.
78.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the
General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity (1987), excerpted in 23
ISR. L. REV. 146, 157-58 (1989).
79.
Id. at 174. The Commission distinguished between the use of force and the
use of torture and insisted that "disproportionate exertion of pressure on the suspect is
inadmissible; the pressure must never reach the level of physical torture or
maltreatment of the suspect or grievous harm to his honour which deprives him of his
human dignity." Id. at 175. For assessments of the necessity argument, see Paul H.
Robinson, Letter to the Editor,23 ISR. L. REV. 189, 190 (1989) ("If there are instances in
which such use of force is justified, the number is relatively small."); Alan M.
Dershowitz, Is It Necessary to Apply "PhysicalPressure"to Terrorists-andto Lie About
It?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 192, 199-200 (1989) (admitting physical methods of interrogation
may be justified in "some circumstances" but insisting such cases are far rarer than
investigators would claim); S. Z. Feller, Not Actual "Necessity" but Possible
"Justification" Not "Moderate" Pressure, but Either "Unlimited" or "None at All," 23
ISR. L. REV. 201 (1989) (arguing the balance of evils rationale for necessity would allow
more force than the Landau Commission admits and physical force in interrogations
should be barred); Kremnitzer, supra note 70 (making similar arguments); Michael S.
Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280, 315-34 (1989) (concluding
torture is morally justified in a narrow range of circumstances); Sanford H. Kadish,
Torture, the State and the Individual, 23 ISR. L. REV. 345, 346 (1989) (arguing torture
is almost always prohibited but there may be extreme cases in which it is permitted).
See also George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and
Moral Point of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975, 1031-32 (1999) (considering the application of
necessity to torture). For general discussions of necessity, see id.; Moore, supra; John
T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 HOUS.
L. REV. 397 (1999) [hereinafter Parry, Virtue].
80.
Tamar Gaulan, Israel's InterrogationPolicies and Practices,1996, available
at http://web.idirect.com/-cic/IsraelDemocracy/tamarGaulanArticle.html.
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The decision to,utilize physical means in a particular instance is based
on internal regulations, which requires obtaining permission from
various ranks of the GSS hierarchy. The regulations themselves were
approved by a special Ministerial Committee on GSS interrogations.
Among other guidelines, the Committee set forth directives pertaining
to the rank authorized to allow these interrogation practices ...
Different interrogation methods are employed depending on the
suspect, both in relation to what is required in that situation and to the
likelihood of obtaining authorization. The GSS does not resort to every
81
interrogation method at its disposal in each case.

In practice, however, GSS investigators often disregarded the limits
that the Landau Commission attempted to put in place. 82 Moreover,
evidence before the court in Public Committee indicated that the
bureaucratization of torture did not restrain its frequency: GSS
interrogators tortured as many as eighty-five percent of detained
8 3
Palestinians.
The interrogations and torture of the individual applicants were
over by the time the court began hearings in Public Committee. Each
applicant had been released or convicted of a crime, was awaiting
trial, or simply was no longer subject to the methods being
challenged.8 4 None sought damages. Instead, they petitioned the
High Court of Justice "to hold that the methods used against them by
the GSS are illegal."8 5

81.
H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel
(Sept. 6, 1999), available at http://207.232.15.136/mishpat/html/en/system/index.html,
at 6, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).
See Joel Greenberg, Israel Reports Abuses in Past Interrogations of
82.
Palestinians,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at A3 (describing an Israeli government report
that concluded GSS investigators "regularly ...violat[ed] the commission's guidelines
and the Shin Bet's own interrogation rules" during the first intifada).
Michael Mandel, Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel, 33
83.
ISR. L. REV. 259, 306 (1999). There is, however, some evidence that GSS interrogation
methods have thwarted some terrorist attacks. See Jason S. Greenberg, Torture of
Terrorists in Israel, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 539, 546 (2001).
See Public Committee, at 4-5.
84.
85.
Id. at 4. Public Committee was not the first torture case to reach the High
Court of Justice. The court admitted that "[a] number of applications dealing with the
application of physical force by the GSS for interrogation purposes have made their
way to this Court throughout the years" but claimed it had never "actually decide[d]
the issue of whether the GSS is permitted to employ physical means for interrogation
purposes in circumstances outlined by the defense of 'necessity."' Id. at 10-11. In 1996,
for example, the court issued an order to prevent the use of physical force in a
particular interrogation, but lifted the order the next day after the GSS claimed it
sought information from the suspect that could prevent future terrorist attacks. Serge
Schmemann, Israel Allows Use of Physical Force in Arab's Interrogation,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1996, § 1, at 8. According to the suspect's attorney, the court's decision
reflected its usual practice of "grant[ing] injunctions only when the state made no
objection, and allow[ing] the use of physical pressures when the state sought it." Id.
See Christie, supra note 79, at 1031 n.306 (discussing the 1996 decision and assuming
it allowed the Israeli government to use torture at least where it could result in a net
saving of lives); Grosso, supra note 75, at 321-23 (discussing the cases). The 1996
decision led to a United Nations investigation of Israel's use of force in interrogations.
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The applicants who had been released or were no longer subject
to torture were in the same position as Lyons; to seek declaratory and
injunctive relief in a federal court against government-sponsored
torture, they would have to make a credible allega.tion that they were
likely to be tortured again. The convicted applicants may have had
less standing than Lyons, because they would have fewer
opportunities to commit acts that could lead to torture during
interrogation. The applicants awaiting trial may have been slightly
closer to having standing under federal law than Lyons, because the
GSS might reopen their interrogations, but this argument seems
nearly as speculative as those rejected in Lyons.
None of this mattered to the High Court of Justice. As to those
who had been released, the court said only, "we have elected to
continue hearing their case, in light of the importance of the issues
they raise in principle. ''86 Later in its opinion, the court stated that,
regardless of the varying nature of the individual applications, "we
have decided to deal with them, since above all we seek to clarify
87
(uncover) the state of the law in this most complicated question."
With these comments, which indicate an utter lack of concern for
standing as we know it, the court moved to the merits.
Chief Justice Barak began by establishing a baseline:
An interrogation inevitably infringes upon the suspect's freedom, even
if physical means are not used. Indeed, undergoing an interrogation
infringes on both the suspect's dignity and his individual privacy. In a
state adhering to the Rule of Law, interrogations are therefore not
88;
permitted in absence of clear statutory authorization.

The court rejected the claim that there was "an administrative
vacuum" such that the government's "residual (prerogative) powers
authorize it to act."8 9 No vacuum exists, the court concluded, because

See Israel Defends Use of Force in Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1997, at A14
(describing criticisms of Israel's interrogation practices during U.N. committee
proceedings). Chief Justice Barak, author of the 1996 opinion, circulated at least one
foreign newspaper criticism of the decision to his colleagues. David Makovsky, A
ConstitutionalBattle: After 50 Years, Israel Tackles FundamentalQuestions, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., May 4, 1998, at 39. Soon thereafter, the court began the hearings that
culminated in Public Committee. See, e.g., Joel Greenberg, Israel Court Weighs Legality
of What Many Call Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999, at A10 (reporting on the court's
hearings in Public Committee).
Public Committee, at 4.
86.
Id. at 11. The remaining two claims were brought by the Public Committee
87.
Against Torture in Israel and the Association for Citizen's Rights in Israel. The
Committee also represented three of the five individual applicants, but there is no
indication that the Association represented specific individuals or classes of individuals
who were subject to or in fear of torture. Id. at 4-5. At least as to the Association, the
court saw no need to determine whether it or its members were "among the injured."
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
Public Committee, at 11-12.
88.
Id. at 12.
89.
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in the absence of legislation, "the relevant field is entirely occupied by
the principle of individual freedom."90 Whether or not a basic law
applies, "[t]here are to be no infringements on this liberty absent
statutory provisions which successfully pass constitutional muster."91
Although the court found legislative authorization for
interrogations in general, it found none for any of the coercive
practices at issue.9 2 Drawing on international law, the court held
that the "law of interrogation" requires an investigation to be "free of
torture, free of cruel, inhuman treatment of the subject and free of
any degrading handling whatsoever. '93 Applying this principle, the
court held that shaking, the Shabach position and its various
components, the frog crouch, cuffing for the purpose of causing pain,
and sleep deprivation as an end in itself are all prohibited. 94 The
court also rejected the government's claim that torture is authorized
in advance by the necessity defense because it leads to information
that saves lives. 95 The court, however, declared its willingness "to
accept that in the appropriate circumstances, GSS investigators may
'96
avail themselves of the 'necessity' defence, if criminally indicted.
As a remedy, the court ruled that the "order nisi" it had entered
in three of the individual petitions comprising the case would "be
made absolute" against the GSS.9 7 At the very least, this ruling is
the equivalent of declaratory relief in the United States. The court,
however, conceded that this remedy requires Israel to fight terrorism
"with one hand tied behind its back."9 8 These comments and Justice
Kedmi's concurring warning that the government was "helpless from
a legal perspective" in emergency situations99 indicate that the court
saw its opinion as providing more than a declaration. Together with

90.
Id.
91.
Id, at 13. The basic laws are legislation that when complete will form the
constitution of Israel, although their status compared to other legislation is uncertain
and depends in part on the language of each basic law. See Basic Laws-Introduction,
http://knesset.gov.il/main/eng/engframe.htm;

MARTIN EDELMAN,

COURTS,

POLITICS,

AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 6-30 (1994); Hon. Dalia Dorner, Does Israel Have a
Constitution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1325 (1999); Marcia Gelpe, Constraints on Supreme
Court Authority in Israel and the United States: Phenomenal Cosmic Powers; Itty Bitty
Living Space, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 493, 500-05 (1999); Ran Hirschl, The Struggle for
Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalizationin
Culturally Divided Polities, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 73, 92-97 (2000) [hereinafter Hirschl,
Struggle]; Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned
ConstitutionalReform: ConstitutionalPolitics in Israel, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 588-89
(1996); infra text at notes 294-308.
92.
See Public Committee, at 12-17, 21.
93.
Id. at 16.
94.
See id. at 17-21.
95.
See id. at 21-25; cf. supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
96.
Public Committee, at 23. See also id. at 26; infra note 291.
97.
Public Committee, at 27.
98.
Id. at 26.
99.
Id. at 29 (Kedmi, J., concurring).
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the reaction of the Israeli government, which took the position that
specific legislation is necessary for coercive interrogations to
continue, 100 these statements suggest that the relief entered by the
court is the functional equivalent of a general injunction against
10 1
torture'
In the final pages of its opinion, the court stressed the limits of
its holding. "Endowing GSS investigators with the authority to apply
physical force during the interrogation of suspects suspected of
involvement in hostile terrorist activities," the court declared, is10a2
question that "must be determined by the Legislative branch.'
Insisting that the legislature authorize these methods before they can
be used, the court continued, "is required by the principle of
Rule of Law, under our very
Separation of Powers and 0the
3
understanding of democracy."'
In contrast to a world in which illegal state violence is inevitable,
Public Committee insists on freedom from illegal state violence.
Although the doctrines of Public Committee may be rooted in aspects
of Israeli legal culture that are irreconcilably different from the legal
culture of the United States, 10 4 such differences by themselves should

Several members of the Knesset have proposed legislation-so far without
100.
success-to allow "physical coercion" in emergency situations. See Deborah Sontag,
Israel Court Bans Most Use of Force in Interrogations,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1999, at Al;
Dan Izenberg, Beilin Warns Peres not to Join Sharon Government, JERUSALEM POST,
Feb. 21, 2001, at 4. See also Mandel, supra note 83, at 313 n.168 (discussing reactions
to Public Committee).
For a brief explanation of orders nisi in Israel, see Yoav Dotan, Judicial
101.
Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court
of Justice During the Intifada, 33 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 319, 323, 323 n.8 (1999) (stating
"[a]n order nisi is one that takes effect at a specified time unless previously modified or
avoided by cause shown or a condition fulfilled," and noting such an order "requir[es]
the respondent to appear in court and show why a particular action should or should
not be performed"). I read these comments to indicate that in Israel an order nisi is
similar to a show cause order and that when made absolute it is similar to an
injunction. My interpretation is supported by the remarks of an Israeli lawyer, who
referred to the court's orders in prior torture cases as "injunctions." See Schmemann,
supra note 85, at 8. See also Matthew G. St. Amand, Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel et al.: Landmark Human Rights Decision by the
Israeli High Court of Justice or Status Quo Maintained?, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 655, 661 (2000) (asserting an order nisi is similar to both a show cause order and
a preliminary injunction that can be made permament).
Public Committee, at 25. See also id. at 26 (observing that whether "it is
102.
appropriate for Israel, in light of its security difficulties to sanction physical means in
interrogations . . . is an issue that must be decided by the legislative branch which
represents the people.").
Id. at 25.
103.
Curran, Cultual Immersion, supra note 23, at 86. For example, the United
104.
States has a common-law legal tradition, while Israel's may best be described as a
hybrid of civil and common law. This difference could lead to fundamentally different
doctrinal assumptions, id. at 78-83 (discussing differences between common law and
civil law perspectives on contract law), although it may not be irreconcilable. Vivian
Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity
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not bar consideration of how to achieve a similar goal. In short,
courts and commentators in the United States should take seriously
the possibility of using Public Committee as a model for confronting
and restraining illegal state violence.
III.

ILLEGAL STATE VIOLENCE AND LEGAL DOCTRINE

Despite the apparent contrasts between the two cases, is it
possible to harmonize Lyons and Public Committee? Israel had a
clear and undisputed policy of torturing suspected terrorists, while
the scope of the policy at issue in Lyons was unclear but almost
certainly did not include regular chokeholds of traffic offenders. I
hope a federal court would apply this reasoning to distinguish Lyons
and grant injunctions in cases involving clear policies of authorized
brutality. But Lyons did involve a policy that probably authorized
some unconstitutional police conduct-in addition to a custom of such
conduct 1 0 5-and the Court insulated that policy from injunctive
relief. Moreover, Public Committee did not state whether the torture
of each petitioner actually fell within the GSS's policy.
GSS
investigators frequently used torture in situations outside the scope
of the written policy, which was not a simple, blanket authorization
of torture in all cases. 106 In addition, the Supreme Court of Israel did
not expressly base standing on the existence of a policy; the fact that
people were being tortured appears to have been sufficient. Finally,
while the doctrinal nuances of Lyons and Public Committee are
important, my focus includes the attitudes towards illegal state
violence that underlie those doctrinal statements. On that level, the
two opinions are far apart.
These differences provide a basis for considering whether the
doctrines of Public Committee would put U.S. courts in a better
position to confront illegal state violence. But making U.S. law look
more like Israeli law may not be easy. The Supreme Court of Israel's
willingness to enjoin torture may be inseparable from its approach to
standing. And the court's approach to standing may rest, in turn, on
a conception of the judicial role that is far different from that of the
United States. U.S. courts are unlikely to remake the judicial role in
order to confront illegal state violence, but it may be difficult to craft

and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001).
Differences in Israeli and U.S. models of judicial review and judicial power are also
important and potentially irreconcilable. See infra text at notes 294-332.
105.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-53; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997)
(creating cause of action for acts "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage"); Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering
"Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17 (2000) (arguing for
broader municipal liability for § 1983 "custom" claims) [hereinafter Gilles, Breaking].
106.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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Yet without their
strong doctrines without going that far.
accustomed role, U.S. courts may not be in a position to craft or
enforce strong doctrines.
This Part considers three interwoven areas in which U.S. courts
could make doctrinal changes to become more like the Public
Committee court: standing, the scope of equitable discretion to
restrain illegal state violence and the related preference for damages
over injunctions, and baseline attitudes toward government
discretion and violence. In Part IV, I consider an additional critical
difference between the approaches of Lyons and Public Committee:
the constraints and freedoms arising from very different conceptions
of the role of courts in a constitutional order.
A. Standing
Subsequent cases in the United States have done little to
mitigate the impact of Lyons. To the contrary, in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, the Supreme Court stated that separation of powers
requires federal courts 'solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.'
and not to "vindicat[e] the public interest." 10 7 According to the Court,
it follows that
a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about
government-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that
no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
10 8
large-does not state an Article III case or controversy.

In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court made
clear that the phrase "generally available grievance" includes Lyons's
effort to enjoin all chokeholds. 10 9

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury
107.
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)). See Pushaw, supra note 66, at 479-80
(criticizing Justice Scalia's reliance on this passage from Marbury); Winter, supra note
54, at 1416 (arguing Marbury is a public rights case).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. Lujan also suggests that Congress lacks power
108.
to expand standing in federal court beyond the limits of Article III, thus creating
uncertainty over the scope of numerous citizen suit provisions in federal statutes. For
an extended and persuasive critique of Lujan, see Sunstein, What's Standing, supra
note 66. For specific discussion of the private rights model of standing, see id. at 18788.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 108-09 (1998) ("Nothing
109.
supports the requested injunctive relief except respondent's generalized interest in
deterrence, which is insufficient for purposes of Article III" (citing City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)); Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 47 ("If the city's
chokehold policy was in fact unconstitutional, the class of all persons potentially
subject to that policy-a class at least as large as the city's driving population-would
be threatened. Yet the individual threats themselves, conceived as injuries, would be
classed by standing doctrine as widespread and undifferentiated.").
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To be sure, the majority opinions in Lyons, Lujan, and Steel Co.
do not provide a complete picture of developments in the law of
standing, especially given the concurrences in Lujan and Steel Co. 110
And Lyons does not bar all injunctions. 1 ' Moreover, a pair of recent
cases-FEC v. Akins 1 2 and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services'13-suggests that the tide of restricting
standing may have crested with the retirement of Justice White.
Whether Akins and Laidlaw mark a significant rollback of standing
restrictions or whether the doctrine has simply stabilized short of
4
Justice Scalia's ambitions for it is unclear."

110.
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 110 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating on behalf of
herself and Justice Kennedy in 5-4 case that "had respondent alleged a continuing or
imminent violation . . . the requested injunctive relief may well have redressed the
asserted injury"); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating on behalf
of himself and Justice Souter in 6-3 case that there was no showing of injury on the
specific facts of the case but suggesting standing would exist if it were "reasonable to
assume that the affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis" or if they had
"claim[edl to have visited the sites since the projects commenced").
111.
The Court has found standing in a few cases notwithstanding Lyons, but
those cases are exceptions to a robust rule of sharply limited standing for equitable
relief. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-12 (1995)
(finding standing to seek injunction against an allegedly unconstitutional statute for
company which had and would bid on every relevant contract under the statute);
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (finding standing in class
action filed by people arrested without warrants and who alleged delays in their
probable cause determinations, because the injury was continuing to at least some
named plaintiffs when the complaint was filed and thus was "at that moment capable
of being redressed through injunctive relief'); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459
n.7 (1987) (finding standing to seek injunctive relief against allegedly overbroad statute
based on plaintiffs allegations of systematic harassment and his four prior arrests
under the statute); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 n.3 (1983) (holding a man
who was arrested fifteen times in less than two years under a California loitering
statute had standing to bring a facial challenge to the statute because there was "a
'credible threat' that Lawson might be detained again"). For discussions of lower court
applications of Lyons to prohibit injunctive relief, see supra note 13.
112.
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (finding "voter standing" to challenge an
FEC decision not to require disclosures by an interest group).
113.
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)
(approving standing to seek civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean Water
Act of individuals who lived near and had expressed interest in using a river into which
the defendant had made discharges in violation of a permit but without harming the
environment).
114.
See Gilles, Representational,supra note 7, at 331 n.97 (arguing Akins and
Laidlaw turn on factual distinctions from prior cases); Shane, Returning, supra note
66, at 11090-92 (suggesting Akins and Laidlaw cut back on prior cases); Cass R.
Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999) (arguing Akins is a significant step toward recognizing
the ability of Congress to create new causes of action); Symposium, Citizen Suits and
the Future of Standing in the 21s, Century: Fron Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond, 11
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 193 (2001) (providing a variety of assessments). For
Laidlaw, compare 528 U.S. at 198-210 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming Laidlaw
undermines Lyons, Lujan, and Steel Company), with id. at 182-88 (majority opinion)
(asserting the decision is consistent with all three cases). For Akins, compare 524 U.S.

2002)

ILLEGAL STATE VIOLENCE

The specific impact of Akins and Laidlaw on the doctrine of
Lyons also remains to be seen. Laidlaw reaffirmed Lyon's holding
that a plaintiff must establish standing for each form of relief
sought. 115 The Court, however, also declared that the question of
standing in Lyons turned simply on "[tlhe reasonableness of [the]
fear" that the challenged conduct would resume. 116 This description
of the Lyons test could lead to some loosening of doctrine. 117 As for
Akins, neither opinion cited or discussed Lyons. The impact on Lyons
of Akins's reformulation of generalized grievance standing is thus
118
unclear.

In short, even after Akins and Laidlaw, federal standing law
reflects a chilling idea of insulated state authority. 119 To make this
point more vivid, imagine a federal case in which an individual
at 32-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming Akins undermines the rule that people with
generalized grievances do not have standing), with id. at 23-25 (majority opinion)
(asserting the decision is consistent with prior cases). See also Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 881 (1983) (arguing separation of powers principles require significant limits
on federal court standing).
115.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.
116.
Id.
117.
Under Laidlaw's version of the Lyons test, the existence or non-existence of
a policy might simply be evidence of reasonable fear. Moreover, a reasonable fear
arguably would be enough to sustain standing even in the absence of a showing that all
members of the LAPD routinely apply chokeholds when arresting, questioning, or
issuing a citation. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983). See also
Fisher, supra note 63, at 1100 (arguing a reasonableness test could mitigate the impact
of Lyons); Harold J. Krent, Redressing the Law of Redressability, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 85, 87, 99-100 (2001) (suggesting Laidlaw undercuts Lyons by allowing suits
when harm is speculative but that the distinction between the two cases is the Laidlaw
Court's deference to Congress).
118.
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer conceded that "where large numbers
of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may
provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance." 524 U.S. at 23.
But he refused to say whether this statement was a constitutional or prudential
standard and then distinguished between abstract generalized grievances-as to which
individuals do not have standing-and concrete generalized grievances-which can
constitute sufficient injury to confer standing. Justice Breyer explained that an
abstract generalized grievance includes "harm to the 'common concern for obedience to
law,"' id. (citation omitted), while a concrete generalized grievance exists where "large
numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass
tort), or where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights conferred
by law." Id. at 24. The examples of concrete grievances are a past injury that supports
damages and a continuing injury to the same group of people that supports statutorilycreated equitable relief. By contrast, Lyons's claim for equitable relief relied on the
assumption that he or others would be subjected to unlawful chokeholds in the future.
Whether this assumption is reasonable or, as the Court held, speculative, see Lyons,
461 U.S. at 105-06, it is distinct from Justice Breyer's examples. In addition, the Lyons
Court described the claim as "no more than [an] assert[ion] that certain practices of law
enforcement officers are unconstitutional," which seems indistinguishable from Justice
Breyer's "common concern for obedience to law." Id. at 111.
119.
See Little, supra note 13, at 952-53 (describing Lyons's impact on civil
rights cases).

98

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:73

claims to have been tortured by government agents. 120 Under Lyons,
the torture victim would be allowed to seek damages for harms
already inflicted but would lack standing to seek an injunction absent
a reasonable likelihood of being tortured again. If agents of a state
government committed the torture, the underlying explanation for
lack of standing would be a federalism concern about interfering in
the activities of state governments. 1 1 If the torture claim were
122
linked to a pending state criminal proceeding, Younger v. Harris
would provide additional federalism reasons to deny standing.
The answer would be the same if federal agents were the
torturers. The underlying explanation for lack of standing to seek
equitable relief would simply switch from federalism to separation
of powers. 123 If the torture claim arose in a federal criminal case,

120.
See supra note 21 (noting discussions by Federal officials of using torture on
suspected terrorists). For cases raising claims of torture by state or federal agents, see
Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing torture of inmates after
1971 Attica prison riot); Wiggins v. Martin, 150 F.3d 671, 673 (7th Cir. 1998)
(describing claim that Chicago police used electric shocks to torture on forty occasions);
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing use of torture to
extract confessions from multiple suspects); Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107
F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing plaintiff to proceed on damages claims that
individuals affiliated with the Drug Enforcement Agency tortured and mistreated him);
United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to dismiss
indictment of defendant who claimed he was kidnapped and tortured by federal
agents); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (requiring dismissal of
indictment if defendant proved he was abducted and tortured by agents of the United
States). See also Amnesty International, Torture, supra note 14, at 6-11, 13-23
(describing recent reports of torture and abuse by police and prison officials); U.S.
Department of State, Initial Report of the United States of America to the UN
Committee Against Torture (Oct. 15, 1999) pt. I General Information at 10-12
[hereinafter U.S. Department of State] (describing situations involving state and
federal officials that are "relevant to the prohibition of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment"), at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights
torture-geninfo.html.
121.
See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 ("recognition of the need for a proper balance
between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions
against state officers engaged in the administration of the States' criminal laws"). This
statement applies to the standards for injunctions, but "case-or-controversy
considerations 'obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a
sound basis for equitable relief."' Id. at 103 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
499 (1974)).
122.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (limiting federal court ability to
enjoin state criminal proceedings). See also O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 499-502 (rejecting
equitable relief that would have allowed ongoing federal court supervision of state
criminal proceedings).
123.
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (stating in case involving state
officials that standing requires federal courts to avoid intruding too much on state and
federal political branches); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596
(D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (affirming dismissal
of damages claims on the basis of sovereign immunity and dismissal of injunction
claims on the basis of equitable discretion "without necessarily disapproving the
District Court's conclusion that all aspects of the present case present a nonjusticiable
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the Ker-Frisbie doctrine would bar the court presiding in that case
from inquiring too closely into treatment of the defendant prior to
trial. 124 Even if the plaintiff sought an injunction to protect a class
of similarly situated individuals, the chances remain strong that a
federal court would dismiss the case for lack of standing unless the
class could make more concrete allegations about the likelihood of
future harm. 125 The same would be true if the plaintiff sought only
126
declaratory relief.
Finally, if Congress or a state legislature passed a statute
explicitly authorizing some form of torture,1 2 7 standing issues would
still exist if the statute, similar to the policy in Public Committee,
simply provided that torture was one available method of

political question"); David Cole, Challenging Covert War: The Politics of the Political
Question Doctrine, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 155 (1985); Mark Gibney, Human Rights
Litigation in U.S. Courts:A HypocriticalApproach, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 261 (1996).
The doctrine provides that "the court need not inquire as to how respondent
124.
came before it." United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992). See
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886). See
also Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
government torture will not support dismissal of an indictment); Matta-Ballesteros,71
F.3d at 763-65 (holding defendant's allegations of mistreatment were insufficient to
Compare Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (requiring
support dismissal of indictment).
dismissal of indictment on proof of torture), with Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent
Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L.
REV. 693, 786, 786 n.358 (1995) (citing Toscanino as an example of a decision
"repeatedly distinguished, even in the circuit of origin").
125.
See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-77 (1976);
O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494 (1974). But see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44, 51-52 (1991) (finding class standing where at least some named plaintiffs had
claims that could have been redressed by injunctive relief at the moment the complaint
was filed). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22
CONN. L. REV. 677, 681, 681 n.15 (1990) (noting division among the circuits on this
issue); Fisher, supra note 63, at 1115-17 (discussing class actions after Lyons);
Kreimer, supra note 13, at 501 n.172 (discussing the problem of class actions after
Lyons in light of a survey of 1994 federal district court cases); Little, supra note 13, at
943, 943 n.53 (noting lower court efforts to apply Lyons in class actions); Meltzer, supra
note 64, at 309-11 (suggesting class actions cannot resolve Article III problems). For a
useful discussion of how Lyons can be distinguished in cases involving group-based
harms resulting from government policies, especially racial profiling policies, see
Garrett, supra note 13. Whether standing in such cases would extend to injunctive
relief against forms of violence that could result from the application of such policies is
far from clear, however.
126.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104; Little, supra note 13, at 942, 942 n.51. See also
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998) (finding no standing to
seek declaratory relief when there was "no controversy over whether petitioner
[violated the law]," with the result that "the declaratory judgment is not only worthless
to respondent, it is seemingly worthless to all the world"); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971) (holding declaratory relief is unavailable if a state criminal prosecution is
pending under the challenged statute).
127.
Early drafts of this Article described such a statute as "unlikely." Although
I still believe that is an accurate description, the events of September 11, 2001 have
altered the possibilities. See supra note 21 (noting discussions about using torture on
suspected terrorists).
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interrogation:' 128 The existence of an official policy does not alone
establish standing to seek an injunction because the victim still must
satisfy the Lyons standard with respect to the application of that
policy. 129 In the more likely case of government agents acting with
less than clear and formal statutory authority-pursuant to a
practice or unwritten or ambiguous policy-the likelihood of standing
diminishes. Thus, in the cases of illegal state violence that are the
focus of this Article and are most likely to occur, individual standing
to seek equitable relief is least likely to exist.
Public Committee shares one quality with Lyons on the issue of
standing: it too is unexceptional. Israel's expansive standing doctrine
allows citizens to petition the court in its capacity as High Court of
13 0
Justice in the absence of a personal, material stake in the outcome.
Unlike the United States, where the rules of standing grew out of a
constitutional provision, [Israel's] rules of standing developed without
any statutory anchor. On the contrary: the statutory language appears
broad and authorizes the High Court of Justice to deal, among other
things, with any violation of law by a governmental authority,
131
regardless of the status of the petitioner.

In addition, the court has not drawn a strong connection between
justiciability and the power to hear a claim. That is, even if

128.
See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106 (stating that to have standing Lyons would have
to make the "unrealistic" claim that the LAPD always applies chokeholds or that the
city "ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner"); see also Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-12 (1995) (requiring more for standing than
existence of statute, regulations, and contract terms).
129.
See Pierce, supra note 28, at 1273 n.206 ("If... Lyons proved at trial that
the agency's de facto policy is to apply chokeholds indiscriminately, I hope that the
majority would find such a policy unconstitutional . . . Because of the unprecedented
manner in which the majority blended the doctrines of standing and remedies,
however, no federal court has the power to enjoin an agency from implementing even a
stated, formal policy of administering chokeholds to anyone who is stopped for a traffic
violation.").
130.
See Allen Zysblat, Protecting Fundamental Rights Without a Constitution,
in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 47, 52-53 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996); Shimon
Shetreet, Standing and Justiciability,in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL, supra at 265; Ariel L.
Bendor, Are There Any Limits to Justiciability? The Jurisprudentialand Constitutional
Controversy in Light of the Israeli and American Experience, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 311, 313 (1997); Gal Dor, Governmental Avoidance versus Judicial Review: A
Comparative Perspective on Israeli Decision-Making Strategies in Response to
Constitutional Adjudication, 13 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 231, 232 (1999); Gelpe,
supra note 91, at 528-30; Hofnung, supra note 91, at 590. This relaxed doctrine is not
without controversy, however. See Dor, supra, at 231 n.5 (quoting Knesset member
who criticized the court for creating a legal regime in which "[e]verything is open;
everything is breached; everything is justiciable"); Mandel, supra note 83, at 292-94
(linking the same statement to a larger set of criticisms of the court's activism).
131.
H.C. 910/86, Ressler v. Minister of Defence, 42(2) PD 441 (Barak, J.),
reprinted and translatedin PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 130, at 275, 279. The
court linked this doctrine to a "judicial philosophy [that] is rooted in the consciousness
that the judge's function is to create rights and maintain the rule of law" rather than
simply "to resolve disputes between holders of existing rights." Id. at 280.
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justiciability is in doubt, the court has no duty to raise the issue 13on2
its own or to decide it at all and may proceed instead to the merits.
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a different approach: proof of
an essential prerequisite to
justiciability, including standing, is
133
theexercise of federal judicial power.
The contrast between U.S. and Israeli standing law and the
importance of standing to the outcomes in Lyons and Public
Committee suggest that a more flexible federal standing doctrine
would be a crucial step toward greater protection for individuals from
illegal state violence. Such a doctrine might take several forms. For
example, Mark Tushnet has proposed a "barebones approach" that
"would insist only on real adversity between plaintiff and defendant,
and a plaintiff capable of generating a reasonably good, 'concrete'
record for decision."'134 Cass Sunstein has proposed a rule that is
potentially more restrictive than Tushnet's but still more expansive
than current law: "people have standing if the law has granted them

132.

In Bergman v. Minister of Finance,for example, the court said:

The Attorney-General relieved us of the need to deliberate on [justiciability] by
stating on behalf of Respondents that they "do not take a position on the
question whether the legal validity of a legislative enactment is a justiciable
matter before this court, since they are of the opinion that the petition must fail
on the merits."... It is therefore up to the court to decide whether it wishes to
examine the question of justiciability. We have decided not to' do so because,
for obvious reasons, the substantive problems raised here require urgent
resolution, whereas clarification of the preliminary constitutional questions
would entail separate, lengthy deliberation. We therefore leave the question of
justiciability open for further consideration and, clearly, nothing in this
judgment should be taken as an expression of opinion on that matter.
H.C. 98/69, Bergman v. Minister of Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693, reprinted and translatedin
8 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 13, 15-16 (Arnold N. Enker
ed., 1992). The court then ruled against the government. Id. at 19. See also Dor, supra
note 130, at 239-40 (discussing the court's willingness to overlook standing issues in
order to reach the merits); id. at 243-44 (discussing the reasons why the court does not
raise justiciability issues sua sponte); Gelpe, supra note 91, at 540-41 ("In Israel, all of
these doctrines [of justiciability] are seen as discretionary and relate to the Supreme
[T]he Supreme Court has the authority to
Court's choice whether to hear a case ....
ignore questions of standing at will, and to reach out and decide cases that would be
beyond the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court").
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). Thus, the
133.
Court will raise questions of standing sua sponte. See Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 63-73 (1997); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977).
Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor
134.
Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1706 (1980) [hereinafter Tushnet, Sociology]. See
also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the appellants alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of
standing."); Shane, Returning, supra note 66, at 11082 ("To conclude that a party has
standing with regard to a particular claim is, at root, to decide that, given the nature of
a particular claim and a litigant's relationship to the particular claim presented, the
suing party is not advancing a case that is collusive or merely abstract.").
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a right to bring suit. 13 5
Either approach would resolve the Lyons problem and allow
federal courts to play a greater role in restraining illegal state
violence because both approaches implicitly reject Lyon's core holding
that a plaintiff must show standing for each form of relief sought,
which in turn led the Court to reject Lyons's claim for injunctive
relief. Indeed, because this core holding is the primary barrier to
individual standing to seek restraints on illegal state violence, a
doctrine that simply did not require proof of standing for each form of
relief-or made it a prudential requirement that Congress could
136
overturn-would probably be sufficient.
None of these proposals goes as far as current Israeli doctrine.
Yet, Israel's expansive doctrine is part of a functioning legal systemalbeit one that is different from the U.S. system in important ways.
Proposals to expand standing in the United States are not new, but
the Israeli experience demonstrates the viability of alternative
approaches and suggests that these proposals are presumptively
reasonable and workable.
A potential objection is that expanded standing would encourage
ideological plaintiffs-or at least partially ideological plaintiffs, as
Lyons may have been-to bring risky claims. The failure of these
claims would create bad precedents that would block the more
concrete claims of better-situated plaintiffs. 137 Several reasons make
this objection unconvincing. First, the number of ideological cases
might not increase significantly if the doctrinal change were simply
to drop the requirement of proving standing separately for each form
of relief while maintaining an overall standing requirement. Second,
the benefits of expanded civil rights protection might outweigh the

135.
Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 66, at 177. See also id. at 191
("Whether an injury is cognizable should depend on what the legislature has said,
explicitly or implicitly, or on the definition of injury provided in the various relevant
sources of positive law."); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1466 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Privatization] ("The
question whether there is a 'case or controversy' within the meaning of article III
depends largely or entirely on positive law, not on the nature of the injury."); Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 88-94 (1984) (arguing interests
created by statutes and the Constitution should create standing).
136.
Richard Fallon made exactly this proposal in his classic analysis of Lyons.
See Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 35-47. But see Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000) (reaffirming this aspect of Lyons).
137.
See Brilmayer, supra note 66, at 306-10. Ideological plaintiffs are often
referred to as "non-Hohfeldian." "A Hohfeldian plaintiff is one who has the 'personal
and proprietary interests of the traditional plaintiff, and [not] the representative and
public interests of the plaintiff in a public action."' Tushnet, Sociology, supra note 134,
at 1708 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
See also Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 3-4 & nn.12-13; Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant in PublicActions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,116 U. PA. L.
REV. 1033 (1968); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as
Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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costs of such an increase in any event. Third, the possibility that
ideological plaintiffs will create bad results must be balanced against
the possibility that the self-interest of nonideological plaintiffs will
lead them to settle winnable cases. Ideological plaintiffs may be
more likely to secure favorable precedents because they have less
incentive to settle. 138 Finally, the distinction between traditional and
ideological plaintiffs is simply not an issue in state violence cases
controlled by Lyons; no one is better situated because no one can
bring equitable claims of the kind Lyons sought to bring. Remember
that the Court ruled that Lyons, who suffered a concrete, physical
injury at the hands of the LAPD, was no different from any other
39
member of the general public when it came to equitable relief.'
A stronger set of objections maintains that an expanded
standing doctrine would open the door to judicial second-guessing of
legislative decisions to vest discretion in executive officials and to
judicial control of executive action. The result would be-or already
is-too much power in the hands of an unelected judiciary and a
corresponding decrease in majoritarian democracy. 140 This vision of
the proper allocation of judicial, legislative, and executive authority
in a system of separated powers is vulnerable to attack, however.
First, even if Israel's standing doctrine goes too far, not all changes in
U.S. standing doctrine would be fatal to the balance of power. So
long as courts could address separation of powers concerns at the

138.
See Lee, supra note 66, at 653-54; Scalia, supra note 114, at 891-92;
Sunstein, Privatization,supra note 135, at 1448; Tushnet, Sociology, supra note 134, at
1711-13. See also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (noting standing turns on injury, not "the
intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy").
139.
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also Meltzer,
supra note 64, at 307 (arguing the ideological plaintiff objection has less force in Lyons
because it would mean no one could sue). A possible response is that we should not be
concerned if no one is better situated, because the case is then entirely public and a
matter for the government to address. This position assumes the existence and
desirability of a strong public rights or private rights distinction; it is also unrealistic
because the government is unlikely to take action as frequently as it ought. See supra
notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 14141); see also Meltzer, supra
note 64, at 278-89, 299-300 (discussing problems with relying on the political process).
140.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. 464; Scalia, supra note 114; see
also Little, supra note 13, at 962-64 (criticizing this view); David A. Logan, Standing to
Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37 (arguing the
Court should use prudential rather than constitutional standing doctrines to address
separation of powers concerns); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on
Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) [hereinafter Nichol, Abusing] (arguing
concerns about the role and power of the federal judiciary have warped standing
doctrine).
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remedies stage, a more incremental approach could move the doctrine
141
without undue harm to majoritarian values.
Second, broad assertions of this theory may conflict with the
original understanding of Article III, which appears to allow a more
flexible approach. 142 Third, these broad objections may not be
entirely desirable despite their association with majoritarian themes.
A system in which unelected judges check the actions of a
representative executive and legislature is not obviously worse than
143
one in which a majority of representatives presumptively prevails.
Deference to majorities and enforcement of minority rights in the face
of majoritarian claims are both fundamental aspects of U.S.
constitutionalism. 144 How we set the balance between them, and
thus how we feel about the proper role and powers of federal judges,
is likely to turn in large part on our assessment of which position will
lead to substantive outcomes with which we agree.
Moreover, the objection from legislative power is too vague. All
too often, as in Lyons and Public Committee, there is no directly
relevant legislative action to review, unless one concludes that the
decision to create a police force with discretion to choose its methods

141.
See infra .otes 170-73 and accompanying text. For additional discussion of
the link between standing, judicial power, and democracy, see infra notes 294-332 and
accompanying text.
142.
See supra note 66. The authorities cited therein also undermine the idea
that there is historical support for stretching Article III's "case or controversy"
language to require a restrictive standing doctrine. See also Sunstein, Privatization,
supra note 135, at 1474 ("article III requires a case or controversy, but whether there is
a case or controversy is something on which, with respect to standing, article III is
silent"); id. at 1478-80 (criticizing other views of article III). The relevant history
suggests that the narrow, private law model of standing is of very recent vintage and
that the traditional model of standing made room, on balance, for a greater number of
plaintiffs. Qui tam actions for money damages and mandamus actions to compel a
clear legal duty were well-established, although the Supreme Court limited mandamus
actions early in the nineteenth century. These actions often took the place of adequate
local oversight of government action and interests and correspondingly declined as local
See Jaffe, supra note 66;
administration became more prevalent and effective.
Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 66; and Winter, supra note 54, at 1375-78.
These surveys suggest that Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000) (finding qui tam standing consistent with
Article III), accords with historical practice, that Lujan is probably inconsistent with it,
but also that Lyons could be a close call. Interestingly, if historical practice is the
guide, the government's power to seek injunctions against public nuisances, as in In re
Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), or United States v. City of Philadelphia,644 F.2d 187 (3d
Cir. 1980), must also be good law. See United Steelworkers of America v. United
States, 361 U.S. 39, 60-61 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); infra notes 271-72.
143.
See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L.
REV. 263, 272 (1992) (arguing the realities of the political process make "the clear
contrast between 'representative' legislatures and 'unrepresentative' judges beginf to
look rather murky"); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty; and the Constitution,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998) (arguing liberty, not majoritarianism, is the primary
constitutional value and provides a firm foundation for judicial review).
144.
See Frank Michel.an, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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is sufficiently particular. Even when relevant legislation exists,
contemporary doctrines of judicial review, the doctrine of avoiding
constitutional questions, the Chevron doctrine, 145 and common-law
doctrines of statutory interpretation already give courts wide latitude
Judicial
to interpret, marginalize, or strike down legislation.
interference with a vague or sweeping grant of authority to the
executive in cases of government violence is not inherently more
controversial. Thus, the majority rule objection becomes serious only
when the legislature has staked out a relatively clear position in
146
support of state violence.
Separation of powers concerns also provide the claim that
expanded federal standing, especially for injunctions, interferes with
the President's authority to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' 14 7 Justice Scalia has been the strongest proponent of this
view. In a 1983 article, he argued that, "so long as no minority
interests are affected," it is "a good thing" when "important
legislative purposes [are] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of
the federal bureaucracy '1 4 -a position that reads the power to
execute the laws for all it is worth. On the Court, Justice Scalia has
continued to raise the alarm against allowing Congress to transfer to
14 9
the courts and individual citizens the power to execute the laws.
The "take Care" objection falls short as well. The President
obviously has discretion to allocate resources for and choose the
manner of executing the laws, but nothing in the Constitution
purports to give the President the authority "to violate the law
through insufficient action any more than . . . to do so through

145.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1408-15 (2000) (describing
the Court's use of Chevron to manipulate administrative authority).
146.
See Mathew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State:
Beyond the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 759, 806-74 (1997)
(arguing democracy-based theories of judicial restraint do not apply to judicial review
of administrative rules and actions); Kreimer, supra note 13, at 459 ("Much of the
constitutional business at the Supreme Court, however, involves the actions of officials
whose claims to represent the will of the people are at least as diffuse as the mandate
of the judiciary.").
147.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
148.
Scalia, supra note 114, at 897.
149.
See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 208-09
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992) (Scalia, J.). See
also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8
(2000) (Scalia, J.) (suggesting possible Article II argument against qui tam standing).
Justice Scalia's Article II claims are closely linked to his advocacy of a unitary
executive. See Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 66, at 211-12; Shane, Returning,
supranote 66, at 11094-102.
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overzealous enfortement."'150 To the contrary, although the "take
Care" clause grants powers to the President, it can also plausibly be
construed as imposing a duty-perhaps even one that is judicially
enforceable. 151 But one need not go so far to conclude that the "take
Care" clause does not grant unreviewable discretion to the President
sufficient to overcome the argument for expanded standing in cases
such as Lyons.
As Lyons illustrates, concerns about judicial intrusion resonate
at least as strongly in the context of federalism. 152 The force of these
objections derives from the sensible proposition that a system in
which states maintain some amount of sovereignty must also require
the federal government and federal courts to respect that
sovereignty.
Moreover, sovereign states have greater power to
pursue state interests, and those interests include-but are not
limited to-the concerns of individual citizens and groups of
citizens. 153 The idea of federalism, however, cannot support sweeping
restrictions on standing to seek the exercise of federal judicial power
such as those imposed in Lyons, unless it is always better ex ante to
permit violations of the Constitution by state actors rather than place
them under the supervision of a federal court injunction. 154 Federal

150.
Sunstein, Privatization,supra note 135, at 1471. For a thoughtful overview
of this issue, see Peter L. Strauss, The Presidentand Choices not to Enforce, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (Winter/Spring 2000). My discussion sidesteps the issue of
presidential power not to enforce statutes that are or might be unconstitutional. See
Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable
Statutes, 63 LAW &, CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Winter/Spring 2000); David Barron,
Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President'sNon-Enforcement Power,
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (Winter/Spring 2000).
See Sunstein, Privatization, supra note 135, at 1471-72; see also Pushaw,
151.
supra note 66, at 416-17 & nn.110-11; Peter M. Shane, The Separation of Powers and
the Rule of Law: The Virtues of "Seeing the Trees," 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 380
(1989)
1
I am unaware of evidence that the faithful execution clause was intended at all
as a power-conferring clause. Its origination in the English Bill of Rights and
the lack of debate surrounding its adoption in this country suggest strongly
that it was understood chiefly as an uncontroversial prohibition on the
executive suspension of statutes, not an aggrandizement of the President's role
in policy making.
Id.; Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 66, at 211-14.
152.
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (1983) (noting
federalism-based objections to federal judicial intrusion on the states).
153.
See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 99-104 (1995).
Put another way, even if we know that a state government has violated the
154.
Constitution and is likely to do so again, the federalism objection to injunction-standing
insists that federal courts must be strictly limited in their ability even to consider
trying to prevent these violations. While I believe such a position is untenable, I am
not arguing that the only acceptable level of constitutional violations is zero or that
every violation requires a complete remedy. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1731, 1778-87 (1991) (stating the ideal of a remedy for every violation of a right cannot

20021

ILLEGAL STATE VIOLENCE

courts must respect state sovereignty, but they must also recognize
valid federal rights.1 5 5
The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which gives federal courts the
power to place state actors under injunction, balances these interests.

Section 1983 derives from Congress's power to enforce the terms of
the Fourteenth Amendment "by appropriate legislation." 156 The
enforcement power includes the ability to abrogate state sovereign
immunity and provide remedies directly against the states for
violations of the Constitution. 1 57 Rather than exercise its full power,
Congress limited liability to individual state actors and
municipalities.158 As the Court noted in Pulliam v. Allen, however,
Congress plainly intended that defendants would be subject to
injunctions when it drafted the original version of § 1983.159 The
federalism-based restriction on standing to seek injunctions imposed
by Lyons thus labors against the Constitution's express grant of
power to Congress and Congress's decision to craft rights of action
and authorize remedies that are well within the scope of its power.
Stripped of clear constitutional or statutory support, the
federalism objection to a modestly expanded standing doctrine
appears to reflect a conclusion either that the substantive rights at
issue are less important than other important social objectives or that
earlier courts have erred in their interpretation of the law-perhaps
because they have substituted their own views of good policy for those

be attained in practice and describing history of incomplete remedies). At the merits
and remedy stages, courts might conclude that the government or its agents should
prevail despite a violation of individual rights. Immunity doctrines and, sometimes,
equitable discretion work in just this way.
155.
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law,
74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988) [hereinafter Fallon, Ideologies] (comparing federalist and
nationalist models of the role and powers of federal courts and concluding both models
should be abandoned in favor of a richer "between the poles" analysis).
156.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The scope of the § 5 power
157.
has been hotly debated of late. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). But Fitzpatrick remains good law. See Kimel,
528 U.S. at 80; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic
Interpretation:Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1259 (2001) (discussing the relationship between Fitzpatrick and recent federalism
decisions).
158.
See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding states
are not "persons" under § 1983); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (holding
language of § 1983 indicates Congress did not intend to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity to suits against states in federal court); Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978) (holding cities are "persons" subject to suit).
159.
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540-41 (1984). See Fallon, Public Law,
supra note 7, at 60-61; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983,
73 Va. L. Rev. 959 (1987) (discussing this issue in the context of considering the extent
to which § 1983 authorizes federal court intervention in state judicial processes).
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of the states. As with separation of powers, this objection reduces to
an argument about the proper role of federal judges, particularly
their use of the power to compel state and federal officials to adhere
to judicial declarations of what the law is.
Notably, the Supreme Court of Israel did not recognize these
kinds of objections as impediments to its decision. The court invoked
"the principle of Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law" as a
reason to hear the case and grant relief rather than as a reason to
stay its hand. 160 As I shall discuss in greater detail below, the court's
reliance on separation of powers as a reason to act draws from its
place in the constitutional structure of Israel, just as the use of
separation of powers and federalism in the United States as reasons
not to act draws from the constitutional role of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
For now, however, it is enough to recognize that an
incremental change in standing doctrine would help courts confront
illegal state violence without infringing too far on federalism and
separation of powers concerns.
B. Equitable Discretionand the Preferencefor Damages
The differences betweenthe Lyons and Public Committee courts
over remedies mirrors their differences over standing. The Lyons
Court stressed the traditional requirements of irreparable future
injury and no adequate remedy at law as prerequisites to an
injunction and expressed concern about interference with state
governments. 161
The Public Committee court never mentioned
irreparable injury or adequate remedy at law requirements and
declared that individual rights take precedence over interference
162
concerns.
Each court could easily have adopted the opposite view. Equity
is flexible almost by definition, and the irreparable injury and
adequate remedy at law rules are not as hard and fast as tradition
would suggest. 163 As Douglas Laycock has demonstrated, courts

160.
H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel
(Sept. 6, 1999), available at http://207.232.15.136/mishpat/html/en/system/index.html,
at 25, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).
161.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
162.
See Public Committee, at 23, 27. The court was considering whether to
make its order nisi absolute and was not specifically discussing the requirements of
injunctive relief. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, when
assessing restraints on the executive, I suspect most courts would consider
requirements of this kind out of concern about conflict with executive officials.
Throughout this discussion, therefore, I shall assume that the Supreme Court of Israel
has discretion in selecting remedies and could have made different choices.
163.
Justice Scalia nicely described the traditional view in Bowen v.

Massachusetts:
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164
regularly grant specific relief when successful plaintiffs request it.
it
Whether the rule is dead or merely weak, 165 lower courts apply 166
with greater flexibility than the Supreme Court did in Lyons.
Under the version of the rule actually applied by common-law courts,
the existence of serious physical injury, the widespread past use of
chokeholds, and the risks of future encounters between the LAPD
and citizens could have led the Lyons Court to find irreparable injury.
The same factors could also have overridden concerns about
interfering with state governments.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Israel could have applied the
irreparable injury rule to preclude relief. Moreover, separation of
powers and political question concerns could easily weigh against
court intrusion on a government that is trying to defend the nation
against the violence of terrorism. 167 The court could have found that
a more limited form of relief or even no relief at all was appropriate
in light of the need to fight terrorism; indeed, the court's earlier

Like the term "damages," the phrase "adequate remedy" is not of recent
coinage. It has an established, centuries-old, common-law meaning in the
context of specific relief-to wit, that specific relief will be denied when
damages are available and are sufficient to make the plaintiff whole. Thus,
even though a plaintiff may often prefer a judicial order enjoining a harmful act
or omission before it occurs, damages after the fact are considered an "adequate
remedy" in all but the most extraordinary cases.
Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879, 925 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
164.
See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE
(1991). I accept Professor Laycock's conclusion that there is little difference between
the irreparable injury and adequate remedy at law requirements: "what makes an
injury irreparable is that no other remedy can repair it." Id. at 8.
165.
For debate about the status of the rule, see DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 92 (2d ed. 1993); DOUG RENDLEMAN,
REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 175-76 (6th ed. 1999) (quoting comments of Professor
Ken York); Doug Rendleman, IrreparabilityIrreparably Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1642 (1992) (book review); Gene R. Shreve, The PrematureBurial of the Irreparable
Injury Rule, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1063 (1992) (book review); Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of
Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145, 156 n.54 (1995).
166.
Professor Laycock argues the Lyons Court confused the irreparable injury
rule with the ripeness doctrine, which would provide an independent basis for
provisional denial of an injunction. LAYCOCK, supra note 164, at 220-22. Laycock also
believes the irreparable injury rule retains its force for preliminary injunctions, which
complements his discussion of ripeness. Id. at 110-23. The injunction in Lyons was
preliminary, which provides some basis for the Court's invocation of a strict irreparable
injury rule. The Court, however, did more than deny preliminary relief; it held that
Lyons could not seek an injunction at all due to his failure to satisfy the irreparable
injury rule. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). Thus, the
distinction between preliminary and permanent injunctions cannot explain the Court's
reasoning and the resulting status of equitable remedies for violations of § 1983.
167.
The court made clear that it understood that terrorism and the threat to
the survival of Israel are important motivations-perhaps even justifications-for
torture. See Public Committee, supra note 22, at 26-27.
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torture cases and the Landau Commission appear to have taken this
168
more restricted approach.
The difference in the courts' approaches thus appears to be less
an issue of strict doctrine and more a matter of when and why to
employ discretion in selecting equitable remedies against
governments. Discretion led the Lyons court to erect high obstacles
to relief for fear of interfering with state governments-and similar
concerns would likely lead to a similar result if the federal
government were the party. 16 9 Discretion, however, also led the
Public Committee court to grant relief in the face of concerns that
restraints on torture would deprive the government of flexibility.
As with standing, federal courts could modify the doctrine of
equitable discretion to favor the injured individual rather than the
violent state. The easiest way to make such discretion possible is to
return the question of remedy to its proper place at the end of a case
rather than link it with justiciability as a barrier to suit. 170 Again, as
with standing, the strongest objection to a change of this kind is the
federalism and separation of powers concern about unelected judges
interfering in legislative and executive tasks and in the affairs of
sovereign states. 17 1 The Supreme Court of Israel was less sensitive
to this charge than was the Supreme Court of the United States. The
reason, again, derives from a different substantive position on the
importance of these concerns, but also from the very different formal
conceptions of the judicial role in the United States and Israel.
Perhaps a change in the nature of federal court power would
obviate these federalism and separation of powers concerns-an issue
I consider in Part IV. Absent such a change, federalism and

168.
See supra text at notes 78-79, 85.
169.
See supra note 123.
170.
See Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 35-47.
171.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112-13 (1983); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-502 (1974); Mishkin, supra note 3 (providing overview of
concerns about institutional injunctions); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPower
Broker. Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43
(1979) (providing a variety of reasons, including federalism and separation of power
concerns, to doubt the ability of federal judges to manage institutional reform); William
A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982) (suggesting the use of equitable discretion in
institutional reform litigation is illegitimate unless the relevant political entities have
defaulted); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) (arguing separation of powers doctrine limits
federal court remedial power); see also Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 63-71
(discussing the relationship of federalism and equity); Meltzer, supra note 64, at 319-20
(discussing the use of federalism as a basis for denying injunctions); David Rudenstine,
Judicially Ordered Social Reform, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 449 (1986) (exploring the tensions
between neofederalist and neonationalist conceptions of the role and powers of federal
courts); Symposium, State Courts and Federalismin the 1980's, 22 WM & MARY L. REV.
599 (1981) (providing a variety of perspectives on the roles and relative competence of
state and federal courts in constitutional litigation).

20021

ILLEGAL STATE VIOLENCE

separation of powers present real issues that courts must consider
when deciding whether to enjoin federal, state, or local governments.
My claim is simply that these concerns do not justify a near-blanket
rule against injunctions for all but repeat players. 17 2 A better
doctrine would link the mix of available remedies to the facts and
circumstances of each case. Under a doctrine of real equitable
discretion, the decision whether to grant an injunction would
continue to take into account the potential intrusion of an injunction
on government action, but the possibility of such intrusion would not
bar an injunction in advance. For example, courts could consider a
range of factors before entering an injunction: whether an injunction
would be too difficult to enforce; the link between the actions
complained of and an existing government custom, policy, or practice;
assurances by the government that the conduct will end; and
institutional competence issues-rather than issues of sovereigntyabout interfering in the workings of law enforcement and other
173
agencies.
In short, I am arguing that federal courts could use equitable
discretion to impose injunctions against governments to prevent
illegal violence while remaining sensitive to legitimate concerns
about court intrusion into the activities of other branches and
sovereigns. But what if damages are a sufficient remedy? Would a
pre-existing injunction have prevented harm to Lyons? In the rest of
this subsection, I shall discuss problems with the traditional
preference for damages and suggest reasons for making some kind of
injunction an equally important remedy for constitutional torts.
Damages are obviously a critical remedy because they provide
compensation for injury and may also deter future violence. 174 Yet
damages do not provide complete compensation in civil rights cases.
In practice, damages are available only for tort-like harms, such as
property damage, medical expenses, pain and suffering, and emotional
distress.
Recovery is not permitted for the inherent value of
constitutional rights, their value as public goods, the "expressive
harms" inflicted by constitutional violations, the moral costs of
breaching deontological prohibitions, third party harms .... or any of
the other conceivable harms to society that may occur when
175
government violates constitutional rights.

172.
See supra notes 13, 111 (describing applications of Lyons).
173.
For discussion of these factors in relation to federal judicial power, see infra
notes 323-24 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of equitable discretion,
see DOBBS, supra note 165, at 66-67, 78-85.
174.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) ("the basic purpose of a § 1983
damages award should be to compensate"); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112-13 (suggesting
damages and the possibility of criminal prosecution will have a deterrent effect).
175.
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 372 (2000) [hereinafter
Levinson, Making Government Pay]. See also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy
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Although current damages doctrine does not allow compensation for
the full cost of a constitutional tort, people who are injured can at
least seek damages for their identifiable personal injuries. Yet the
qualified immunity doctrine ensures that some plaintiffs injured by
unconstitutional conduct will not receive compensation because
reasonable government actors would not have known that their
conduct was unconstitutional. 176 Qualified immunity does not shield
local government entities, but proof of municipal liability on the
17
merits raises its own set of difficulties. 7
Even if plaintiffs can satisfy the qualified immunity standardas they probably could in cases similar to Lyons but not in all
excessive force cases 1 7 8 -they may not be able to collect damages.
Individual officers may be judgment proof, while indemnification may
be uncertain and incomplete. 1 79 Finally, juries might not award
significant-or any-damages against a law enforcement official who
they believe made a bad decision in difficult circumstances. 18 As a
result, success rates in constitutional tort cases are lower than in
other categories of cases.1 81 Moreover, limits on damages and the

Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1999) [hereinafter Jeffries, RightRemedy] ("many victims of constitutional violations get nothing, and many others get
redress that is less than complete").
176.
Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2155-57 (2001) (explaining application of
the qualified immunity standard); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(stating the standard for qualified immunity); Gilles, Breaking, supra note 105, at 2527 (explaining how qualified immunity allows officers to avoid liability for violations of
the constitution); Jeffries, Right-Remedy, supra note 175, at 93-94 (explaining the
same).

177.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Gilles, Breaking, supra
note 105, at 35-48; Symposium, Section 1983 Municipal Liability Civil Rights
Litigation, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 619 (1999).
178.
The Court's recent decision in Saucier v. Katz notes that in excessive force
cases, qualified immunity requires considering the possibility that the officer-defendant
"did not know the full extent of the threat [plaintiff] posed or how many other persons
there might be who, in concert with [plaintiff] posed a threat." Katz, 121 S. Ct. at 2160.
The claim in Katz involved a protest during a speech by the Vice President at a military
base. But officers on regular patrols could probably make credible arguments in many
excessive force cases that they did not know the full extent of the threat and were
unsure whether the plaintiff was acting in concert with others.
179.
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269 n.30 (1981); Gilles,
Breaking, supra note 105, at 30-31. See also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 161-62
(1985) (noting state refused to defend police officers who used excessive force after "a
'complete breakdown' in police discipline had created an 'uncontrolled' situation"); John
C. Jeffries Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV.
47, 50 (1998) [hereinafter Jeffries, Praise] (suggesting "the state or local government
officer who is acting within the scope of his or her employment in something other than
extreme bad faith can count on government defense and indemnification").
180.
See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants:
Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 499, 548-49 (1993);
Gilles, Breaking, supra note 105, at 30 n.50; Jeffries, Praise,supra note 179, at 50.
181.
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort
Litigation:The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant,
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impact of these limits on attorney fees reduce the incentives to take
18 2
cases that do not promise a substantial recovery.
Although damages provide incomplete compensation for real
harms under current doctrine, they also have a deterrent function.
If, as Justice White hypothesized in Lyons, damages are a sufficient
deterrent, then injunctions are superfluous. An award of damages to
Lyons will compensate him to some degree, deter the officers involved
and other officers from similar conduct, and pressure the LAPD to
change its ways.
Damages may not perform their deterrent function very well,
either. First, the Court and commentators have argued that damages
risk creating too much deterrence, with the result that law
enforcement officials will refrain from conduct that is constitutional
and socially desirable. 8 3 To prevent overdeterrence, damages must
be reduced or liability must be prevented through mechanisms such
as qualified immunity.
Yet reduced damages and increased
immunity create their own problems by weakening the compensation
function of damages.

73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 726-35 (1988) (describing results of study showing that nonprisoner civil rights cases in three federal judicial districts in 1980-81 had a fifty
percent success rate including favorable settlements, that civil rights cases against
police had a sixty percent success rate, that other civil cases had an eighty-four percent
success rate, and that the amounts of money recovered in civil rights cases are
relatively low); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil
Rights and PrisonerCases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989) (finding low success rates relative
to other cases for plaintiffs in federal trials of civil rights actions). See also Kreimer,
supra note 13, at 492-96 (reporting similar results for civil rights cases against police
from all of the reported federal district court cases in 1994).
182.
Limits on damages, the possibility that an award of nominal damages will
lead to no award of fees, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), and the possibility of fee
waivers, Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), make lump sum settlements and
resulting reduced fees more likely, which in turn reduces the incentives of attorneys to
take cases. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practices in the 1990's: The
Dichotomy Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197 (1997). The recent
decision in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home u. W Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598 (2001), rejecting the catalyst theory for fee awards, is likely further to
reduce the incentive to take cases.
183.
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 408 (1997); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); PETER H.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 68-77 (1983);
Jeffries, Praise, supra note 179, at 73-78; Jerry L. Mashaw, Civil Liability of
Government Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 8, 26-28 (Spring 1978); Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for
Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 640 (1982); Note,
Government Tort Liability, ill HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2015-16 (1998). See also Barbara
E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 585-88
(1998) (describing arguments for and against the overdeterrence argument); Mark R.
Brown, The Failure of Fault under § 1983: Municipal Liability for State Law
Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1522-25 (1999) (arguing overdeterrence can be
a social good).
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Indemnification and insurance may mitigate overdeterrence to
some extent.18 4 Another alternative is to increase the scope of
municipal liability while reducing individual liability, on the theory
that officers will have the leeway to exercise discretion while local
government will be on the hook for compensation and thus have
incentives to regulate law enforcement conduct. 1 85 Both steps risk
shifting the problem of overdeterrence to the general governmental
level.
Moreover, increased municipal liability might force
governments to raise taxes or shift resources away from other tasks,
with potential undesirable consequences for the state's ability to
186
protect citizens and perform other functions.
Second, underdeterrence may be just as likely a consequence of
constitutional tort damages as overdeterrence.
Most claims of
overdeterrence are based on speculation rather than evidence.' 8 7 In
fact, some evidence suggests that the success rate of constitutional
tort claims and the amount of resulting damages are quite small
relative to non-civil rights cases. 188 If this evidence is representative,
damages are unlikely to provide sufficient deterrence.
Moreover, even if damages are readily available in significant
amounts, they may not generate sufficient deterrence at the
governmental level. According to Daryl Levinson, the claim that
damages deter undesirable government behavior mistakenly assumes
that governments "respond to costs and benefits in the same way as a
private firm."'189 If, as Levinson argues, "government actors respond
to political, not market, incentives, we should not assume that
government will internalize social costs just because it is forced to
make a budgetary outlay."'9 0
In fact, Levinson concludes that
underdeterrence is the most likely result of a preference for damages:
So long as the social benefits of constitutional violations exceed the
compensable costs to the victim and are enjoyed by a majority of the
population, compensation will never deter a majoritarian government

184.
See John D. Kirby, Note, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations:
Refining the Standard, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 462, 486-87 (1990).
185.
See SCHUCK, supra note 183, at 100-13; Posner, supra note 183, at 641;
Note, supra note 183, at 2018.
186.
See Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note 175, at 412; William J.
Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1213, 1225-26 (1998).
187.
Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment
and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 102 (1997);
Meltzer, supra note 64, at 291.
188.
See supra note 181.
189.
Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note 175, at 347.
190.
Id. at 347. See also ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING
GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA

108-09 (1999) (explaining why public sector employers are less sensitive to market
forces than private sector employers); James R. Levine, Note, The Federal Tort Claims
Act: A Proposal for Institutional Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1569 n.172 (2000)
(collecting citations).
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from violating constitutional rights, because the majority of citizens will
gain more from the benefits of government activity than they lose from
the taxes necessary to finance compensation payments to victims.
Adding compliance costs just makes the benefits to the majority of
191
violating constitutional rights that much greater.

Levinson's analysis does not discuss punitive damages and attorney
fees, both of which are available in § 1983 excessive force cases and
should increase deterrence. 19 2 The amount of additional deterrence
may depend, however, on whether a local government defends its
officers and indemnifies them against punitive damages. Yet even a
local government that indemnifies its officers may not be optimally
deterred if it fails to internalize costs sufficiently. In any event,
although Levinson's claims may be a bit dramatic, 9 3 some evidence
supports his theory that governments are not good at internalizing
194
costs and changing behavior.

191.
Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note 175, at 370. Levinson also
considers whether deterrence fares any better under interest group and bureaucratic
models of government decisionmaking; he concludes it does not. Id. at 379-80, 386. To
the contrary, he concludes that "the more moving parts and debatable assumptions
added to the overall model of government outcomes, the less confident we can be in
making even highly contextual predictions about the effects of requiring
compensation." Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note 175, at 386. See also
NELSON, supra note 190, at 93-100 (explaining theory of organizational inequality,
which relies on "normative, cultural, and institutional forces operating in work
organizations" rather than market forces to describe unequal pay).
192.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2001) (allowing fee awards to prevailing parties); see
also supra note 182 (discussing limits on fees). Punitive damages are available against
individual § 1983 defendants who act with evil motive or intent or with reckless or
callous indifference to the rights of others. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
Punitive damages, however, are not available against local government entities. See
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); see also 1 NAHMOD, supra
note 13, at 4-128-4-132 (stating punitive damages are relatively easy to obtain in
excessive force cases); Michael Wells, PunitiveDamages for ConstitutionalTorts, 56 LA.
L. REV. 841, 856-64 (1996) (providing overview of punitive damages issues and arguing
that they are ineffective for constitutional torts in general because they are not
sufficiently available).
193.
See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent
Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001) (arguing Levinson's
claims are overstated).
194.
For discussion of local government responses to § 1983 suits, see Richard
Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits do not Deter Police
Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 587 (2000) (arguing deterrence has failed in New York City chiefly because of
indemnification). See also Lant B. Davis et al., Project, Suing the Police in Federal
Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 812-14 (1979) (finding "few changes in police department
practices" resulting from pre-Monell § 1983 suits in Connecticut and noting that "[n]o
injunctions ordering changes in police procedures were issued in any case in the
sample"); Kreimer, supra note 13, at 499-501 (collecting damages figures for civil rights
cases against police and concluding that "the real effect of such litigation, if an effect
exists at all, will usually be heuristic rather than deterrent"); Meltzer, supranote 64, at
284-86 (discussing problems with relying on damages to deter constitutional
violations). In Los Angeles, attorneys have been litigating excessive force claims since
at least 1965, and the "police-brutality bar" has been described as "flourishing." Boyer,

116

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:73

Finally, if.Levinson is wrong and the full measure of damages
and attorney fees in fact risk overdeterring, then we ought to expect
governments to prefer injunctions, which hold out the possibility of
clear rules and far less financial liability. And if governments
actually do prefer injunctions to damages, then courts should be less
skittish about imposing them. If, on the other hand, governments
prefer to pay damages rather than submit to an injunction, then
perhaps we must add to the deterrence calculus the benefit to the
government of paying damages. That is, to avoid underdeterrence,
we must discount the supposed deterrent value of damages to account
for the benefit received from not having to submit to the intrusion
and disruption of an injunction. 195
If damages risk producing inadequate deterrence, then we
should consider increased use of injunctions. Remember that the
issue is not the choice between damages or an injunction, but rather
whether we should prefer a pool of available remedies that includes
damages and injunctions in cases similar to Lyons. If injunctions add
something that damages fail to provide and the added benefit
outweighs the accompanying costs, then injunctions should be
available in illegal state violence cases.
Absent the standing requirements imposed by Lyons, a claim for
injunctive relief has at least one advantage over a claim for damages
from the plaintiffs' perspective: the qualified immunity doctrine does
not apply to claims for injunctions. 196 On the other hand, because

supra note 16, at 64. The damages won by a flourishing police-brutality bar-$67.5
million in the 1991-95 period, see Kreimer, supra note 13, at 449 n.166-should have
provided sufficient incentive for the LAPD to reform itself, unless the qualified
immunity doctrine and the City's failure to internalize social costs have in fact led to
underdeterrence. Whatever changes the LAPD has made, valid excessive force claims
continue to accumulate, see supra note 16, and the department will now have the
chance to reform itself under the auspices of a federal consent decree. See supra note 6.
New York City announced several changes in police policies in the wake of the Justice
Department's investigation and the $8.75 million settlement of Abner Louima's
claims-the largest settlement the City has paid in a police brutality case. While the
settlement was obviously important, the threat of a federal injunction also played a
crucial role. See Kevin Flynn, Louima Case One Factor in Changes for the Police, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2001, at B1; Alan Feuer & Jim Dwyer, City Settles Suit in Louima
Torture, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at Al.
195.
Compare Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh
Amendment, IrreparableInjury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1329 (2001)
(suggesting injunctions are more intrusive than damages), with Christina Whitman,
Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 42 (1980) (arguing injunctions are less
disruptive than damages).
196.
See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996) (noting "no 'clearly
established' right need be alleged" in actions for injunctive relief); Ryder v. United
States, 515 U.S. 177, 185 (1995) (stressing qualified immunity applies only to damages
actions); Pulliam v. Allen. 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding state judges are not immune
from injunctive relief under § 1983), superseded in part by Pub. L. No. 104-317 § 309(c)
(amending § 1983 to bar injunctions against judicial officers in most circumstances);
Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732, 736 (1980) (noting
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injunction claims are functionally against a government rather than
its officials-despite the Ex parte Young fiction' 97 -plaintiffs may
have to prove a policy of unconstitutional conduct, which is more
198
difficult than proof of individual liability.
Whether or not injunctions are easier to obtain, they hold out the
possibility of a more complete remedy, and, in particular, a remedy
that prevents harm rather than simply puts a price on it. 199 First,
injunctions create rules, which in turn foster reliance. 200 As a result,
an injunction against state violence is likely to have some restraining
impact because it creates standards for future conduct. State actors
will adjust their behavior and fewer people will be harmed.
Second, injunctions have expressive power. 20 1 Although they
cannot guarantee freedom from state violence, injunctions express
our right to be free of it in advance and up the ante for state actors

prosecutors "are natural targets for § 1983 injunctive suits since they are the state
officers who are threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law" and holding
state courts and judges can be sued for injunctive relief under § 1983 when they act in
an "enforcement capacity" but state legislators cannot be sued for injunctions for
actions taken in their legislative capacity); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314-15
n.6 (1975) (stating in § 1983 case that "immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar
equitable relief as well"). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.34 (1982)
("express[ing] no view" on whether qualified immunity applies to injunction claims).
Lower courts and commentators have reached the same conclusion. See Armacost,
supra note 183, at 669 n.410; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 154, at 1749 n.88, 1804-05;
Jeffries, Right-Remedy, supra note 175, at 110; Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in
Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 600-01 n.13 (1989)
(collecting cases); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power': The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 696, 858, 858 n.776 (1998); Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1500 n.ll0 (1996); 2 NAHMOD, supra note 13, at 8-4 n.2.
197.
Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
198.
See Gilles, Breaking, supra note 105, at 35-48.
199.
See Standen, supra note 165, at 150-51.
200.
See Whitman, supra note 195, at 50; see also Larry Alexander, 'With Me,
It's All er Nuthin"'"Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 533 (1999)
(providing hypothetical in which a factory owner loses a lawsuit over dumping
hazardous chemicals and observing that to decide "whether he may continue dumping,
he need only consult the terms of the authoritative settlement, which will tell him that
he may not").
201.
Since § 1983 itself has a symbolic function, this aspect of injunctive relief is
hardly trivial. See Whitman, supra note 195, at 21-25, 52-53. Of course, damages also
have expressive power, see Armacost, supra note 183, at 669-70, but the message is not
necessarily the same. See Parry, Virtue, supra note 79, at 427-28 (noting the
complexities of determining the social meaning of government conduct).
For
discussions of the expressive functions of law, see Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition
of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum,
Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 302-03, 351-52,
353-57 (1996), and sources cited therein. See also Matthew Adler, Expressive Theories
of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (criticizing some versions
of expressive theories); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories
of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) (defending a version of
expressive theory similar to that invoked here).
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who might consider using violence. 20 2 Moreover, an injunction
attempts to remake relationships between people, and in cases of
state violence, between people and governments. Injunctions thus
"present a view of the world which others are asked to share"20 3 -a
world in which state violence is limited rather than commonplace. By
contrast, the world presented to us by Lyons-"the kind of society
that [the decision] appeals to and seeks to engender" 204-is one in
which illegal state violence is neither constrained in advance nor
effectively punished after the fact.20 5
Put plainly, damages
compensate for harms that may result from systemic problems but
are inefficient at creating systemic change, while injunctions can
address those systemic problems directly and perhaps even more
2 06
efficiently.
Third, courts have the power to compel compliance with an
injunction through the contempt power. Fines for contempt can
rapidly outstrip the amount of any likely damages award, which
creates a much greater likelihood of compliance and deterrence. 20 7 If,
however, an injunction is sufficiently complex-as they threaten to be
in disputes over police conduct-contempt sanctions run the risk of
being categorized as criminal and thus will require more extensive
proceedings to protect the alleged contemner's constitutional
8
rights.20

202.
Winter, supra note 54, at 1391-93, 1489.
203.
Jerry Frug, Argument as Character,40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 872 (1988).
204.
Id. at 874.
205.
See Susan Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1389, 1467 (1992) (describing a court's refusal to enter an injunction against illegal
conduct by attorneys and concluding that, "[bly denying relief, the court showed a weak
commitment to the little law it did create ....It refused to back its interpretation with

force ....
").
206.
Whitman, supra note 195, at 49-50. As should be clear by now, this
discussion implicitly adopts a preference for a public law model for constitutional tort
litigation rather than a private law model, which in turn colors my consideration of
federalism and separation of powers issues. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S.
561, 574 (1986) (plurality opinion) (declaring that a civil rights claim is "more than a
private tort suit" because it "vindicate[s] important civil and constitutional rights that
cannot be valued solely in monetary terms"); see also Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983
Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1989) (discussing
implications of using tort language in § 1983 cases); Wells, supra note 192, at 856-64
(arguing for increased punitive damages as part of a public law model for constitutional
torts).
207.
See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265-(1990) (holding contempt fines
against city that began at one hundred dollars per day and doubled to a cap of one
million dollars per day were not an abuse of discretion but striking down sanctions
against nonparty city council members); Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note
175, at 416-17. For a general discussion of contempt sanctions, see DOBBS, supra note
165, at 130, 135-38.
208.
Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833-34
(1994). Criminal contempt proceedings require the full panoply of criminal procedure
rights, while civil contempt proceedings resemble an ordinary civil hearing. For
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The possibility that a complex injunction must be enforced
through criminal contempt highlights a potential problem with
Any injunction, but
injunctive relief in these circumstances.
particularly one that addresses the conduct of multiple government
actors in multiple circumstances, must be drafted with reasonably
precise language, which requires substantial time on the part of the
judge. 20 9 As Jeff Standen has explained, to craft an injunction judges
must "assess the likelihood that harm would result, the steps needed
to preclude it, and the value of the interests at stake."210 Failure to
be precise makes the injunction-particularly an institutional reform
injunction, which by its nature is intrusive--"clumsy" and difficult to
administer.2 1 ' Not only does a clumsy injunction run the risk of
failing to protect the plaintiffs rights, it may also fail to give
adequate notice to the defendant, which in turn will lessen the
2 12
possibility of using contempt as a sanction.
A clumsy injunction thus is harder to enforce and risks both over
and under deterrence.2 13 To some degree, then, injunctions are

discussion of the differences between civil and criminal contempt proceedings and
related issues of due process, see Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75
WASH. L. REV. 345 (2000).
209.
Standen, supra note 165, at 161.
210.
Id. at 187.
211.
Id. at 185-88. See also Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 39-40
(discussing complexity problems of institutional injunctions); Meltzer, supra note 64, at
320-26 (discussing the same). The consent decrees obtained by the Department of
The April 1997
Justice in § 14141 litigation reflect an increasing complexity.
See
Pittsburgh decree is fourteen pages and covers a wide array of practices.
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm. The December 2000 Los Angeles
decree is forty-five pages and covers an even wider array of practices in greater detail.
See http://www.usdoj.gov/split/documents/laconsent.htm.
212.
See DOBBS, supra note 165, at 159 (noting defendants often raise ambiguity
as a defense to contempt). For other reasons why an injunction is no panacea in cases
of police violence, see Bandes, supra note 14, at 1279-80 (listing a variety of doctrines
and police practices that impede the ability of plaintiffs to hold police accountable for
illegal acts).
213.
Cf.Francis X. Clines, Police in CincinnatiPull Back in Wake of Riots, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2001, at Al (reporting Cincinnati police are engaged in less vigorous
The Cincinnati
law enforcement in the wake of protests over their behavior).
experience could be read to suggest that public opinion and by extension the political
process are alternatives to injunctive relief. An aroused populace can generate changes
in police behavior, which might be ratified by legislators seeking to satisfy the demands
of constituents. At least in Cincinnati, however, public opinion has been far clumsier
than any likely injunction would have been. Some claim the police have simply stopped
policing in certain neighborhoods, which has led to a large increase in violence,
injuries, and fatalities. Id. While in theory an injunction could generate similar
results, injunctions are far more likely to be tailored and less tinged with hostility than
public opinion. Thus, while public opinion is crucial to democratic change, it is not a
substitute for an injunction. As for the political process, representative bodies should
take the lead in addressing illegal state violence. But we can still provide remedies to
protect citizens when the political process fails them. See also Meltzer, supra note 64,
at 287-89, 299-300 (discussing the limits of political process remedies). The next
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similar to other remedies for personal injuries; they are inexact and
may not be as effective in practice as they are in theory. Indeed, if
injunctions directed at governments run a sufficiently high risk of
failing, 214 then federalism and separation of powers concerns about
intrusion loom even larger. But because no remedy is precise, the
risks of over and under deterrence associated with injunctions should
not lead to rules against injunctions, any more than the imprecision
of damages should lead to rules against damages.
Remedial
imprecision suggests the need for flexibility, so that courts can choose
from an array of remedies that best address the circumstances of the
individual case.
Consider the preliminary injunction entered by the district court
in Lyons, which was less intrusive than most institutional reform
injunctions. 215 Part of the order simply required improved training
and record-keeping, which would have been fairly easy to draft,
comply with, and supervise. 2 16 The heart of the injunction, however,
prohibited the use of chokeholds "under circumstances which do not
threaten death or serious injury."217 Officers considering whether to
use a chokehold would first have to evaluate the circumstances,
which might be difficult to do in the heat of a confrontation. Officers
might refrain from acting and then find themselves at greater risk in
some cases. Or they might mistakenly perceive a threat and respond
with a chokehold. Unless it disregarded fault altogether, the court in
a subsequent contempt proceeding would have to assess the
reasonableness of the officer's actions and the credibility of the
story-exactly what a jury would be asked to do in an excessive force
case. Thus, compliance with and supervision of the injunction might
have been difficult and could have led to overdeterrence. Still, given
the record of the LAPD, the district court was correct even if it erred
on the side of too much deterrence. Faced with the violation of
constitutional rights, the court had to decide whether to risk
protecting too much in order to safeguard the right, or risk leaving
the right vulnerable by protecting too little. The need to prevent
harm to citizens of Los Angeles and the expressive power of an
injunction limiting the use of chokeholds provide a reasonable basis
for the court's decision.

section is, in part, an effort to blend injunctive relief with the political process, so that
courts would protect citizens without displacing politics.
214.

Cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT

SOCIAL CHANGE (1991) (providing pessimistic account of ability of courts to change
social conditions).
215.

Fallon, Public Law, supra note 7, at 44; Meltzer, supra note 64, at 322.

216.
217.

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 99-100.
Id. at 100.
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The same or greater compliance and enforcement issues almost
certainly exist for § 14141 consent decrees.21 8 These issues suggest
the possible utility of less intrusive remedies at an earlier stage. The
Lyons injunction, or the no-restraint injunction discussed in the next
section, might have mitigated or even resolved some of the problems
that made the forty-five page Los Angeles consent decree
necessary. 219 In other words, federal courts should not have to choose
between no equitable relief or a detailed § 14141-style injunction in
private-plaintiff civil rights cases. An intermediate position would
allow private plaintiffs to seek injunctions against unauthorized or
unregulated law enforcement activities. More detailed-and thus
more intrusive-injunctions could remain available in extraordinary
cases or when less intrusive efforts fail. In addition, complex
injunctions would remain a staple of § 14141 cases brought by DOJ,
most of which end in consent decrees negotiated by experts on both
sides.
Injunctions thus provide an important additional remedy in
cases challenging illegal state violence. But, like other remedies,
they are not problem-free. 220 Injunctions must be sufficiently precise
that plaintiffs' rights will be protected, defendants will know how to
modify their behavior to an appropriate degree, and courts can
supervise and enforce them. Injunctions that attempt to codify a
right to be free of excessive force are vulnerable to ambiguity and
possibly excessive intrusiveness. If, however, we could restate the
right in more concrete terms, federal courts would be better able to
enforce it in private-plaintiff cases through equitable relief. The next
section considers the possibility of a different baseline position
toward government violence which, if enforced by federal courts,
could generate injunctions that help to prevent illegal state violence
with greater precision and less intrusion.

218.
See supra note 211 (describing representative § 14141 consent decrees).
219.
See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
As part of its effort to show that other remedies made injunctions
220.
unnecessary, Lyons noted that criminal prosecutions of violent state actors are
available. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113. Prosecutions are probably inadequate, however,
because they fail to prevent harm, grand juries are reluctant to indict, and judges and
juries are reluctant to convict in all but the most egregious cases-which weakens
whatever deterrence is created by the threat of prosecution and may even cause the
ultimate message to be one of tolerance for state violence. See supra notes 15, 19, 20;
Colbert, supra note 180, at 500-01, 548; Gilles, Breaking, supra note 105, at 19.
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C. Baseline Attitudes toward Government Violence:
The No-RestraintRule
On the merits, Public Committee adopted a baseline position
that government actions restricting individual rights are barred
unless specifically authorized by the legislature:
An interrogation inevitably infringes upon the suspect's freedom, even
if physical means are not used. Indeed, undergoing an interrogation
infringes on both the suspect's dignity and his individual privacy. In a
state adhering to the Rule of Law, interrogations are therefore not
permitted in absence of clear statutory authorization, be it through
primary legislation or secondary legislation, the latter being explicitly
rooted in the former. . . . Thus, an administrative body, seeking to
interrogate an individual-an interrogation being defined as an
exercise seeking to elicit truthful answers, as opposed to the mere
asking of questions as in the context of an ordinary conversation--must
point to the explicit statutory provision which legally empowers it. This
22
is required by the Rule of Law (both formally and substantively). 1

This holding reflects settled doctrine that individual freedom from
government restraints is a fundamental assumption of the Israeli
or not the particular freedom at issue is
constitutional order, whether
2 22
specified in a basic law.

Freedom from government restraints is a basic tenet of the U.S.
constitutional system as well, 22 3 but not to the extent articulated by
the Public Committee court. Lyons suggests that as a matter of
federal constitutional law, law enforcement officials have

221.
H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel
(Sept. 6, 1999), available at http://207.232.15.136/mishpat/html/en/system/index.html,
at 11-12, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999) (emphasis added). See also id. at 12 ("the
relevant field is entirely occupied by the principle of individual freedom").
Id. at 11-13; Dorner, supra note 91, at 1326, 1327, 1331; Gelpe, supra note
222.
91, at 509, 523-28. In addition, Article 1(a) of Israel's Criminal Procedure Statute
states that "[dietentions and arrests shall be conducted only by law or by virtue of
express statutory authorization for this purpose." Public Committee, at 12. See also
Mark Tushnet, The Universal and the Particularin ConstitutionalLaw: An Israeli Case
Study, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1327, 1342-43 (2000) (describing Kol Ha'am v. Minister of
the Interior, 7(2) P.D. 871 (1953), as the source of the doctrine that the government
must act within the boundaries of statutory authority and of the presumption in favor
of individual liberty) [hereinafter Tushnet, Universal]. For critical discussions of the
court's application of this principle, see Ran Hirschl, Israel's 'ConstitutionalRevolution':
The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal
Economic Order, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1998) [hereinafter Hirschl, Revolution];
Mandel, supra note 83, at 296-307, 316-21.
223.
Excessive force, torture, and other forms of degrading treatment are barred
by the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the due process clauses, and
various federal and state laws. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); U.S. Dep't of State,
supra note 120, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human..rights/torture-geninfo.html,
8-9, http://www.state.gov/www/globat/human-rights/torturearticles.html 2-5, 16-17, 3135, 38-45.
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considerable discretion to use force against nonresisting citizens. The
Court, of course, did not explicitly reach the merits, but the idea that
rulings on standing overlap with the substantive merits of a case is
by now familiar. 224 Similarly, the Court's ruling that Lyons could not
show irreparable injury also carries with it a hint of the merits. My
discussion thus draws an impression of the Court's position on one
aspect of the merits-the baseline position toward illegal state
violence-out of its discussions of standing and irreparable injury. 22 5
Lyons appears to reflect a basic assumption about the powers of
law enforcement in the United States. For example, the scope of
authority to investigate and interrogate an individual at the federal
level is not detailed in any statute or regulation. Federal law
provides that the Attorney General may appoint officials "to detect
and prosecute crimes against the United States" and "to conduct such
other investigations regarding official matters ... as may be directed
by the Attorney General. '226 In addition, FBI agents
may carry firearms, serve warrants and subpoenas issued under the
authority of the United States and make arrests without warrant for
any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or
for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they
have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has
227
committed or is committing such felony.

224.
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
and State Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("there is an impulse
to decide difficult questions of substantive law obliquely in the course of opinions
purporting to do nothing more than determine what the Court labels 'standing");
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988) ("The
essence of a true standing question is the following: Does the plaintiff have a legal right
to judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty? This question should be seen as a
question of substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory or constitutional
provision whose protection is invoked.").
225.
I am not addressing the Court's position on all aspects of the substantive
merits of Lyons's claim, although I should mention again that in Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court accepted part of his claim when it ruled that the use of
deadly force against nondangerous, fleeing suspects violates the Constitution.
226.
28 U.S.C. § 533 (2001). Other sections provide authority "to investigate"
specific categories of crimes. See 28 U.S.C. § 535 (2001) (crimes involving government
officers and employees), § 538 (aircraft piracy), § 540 (felonious killings of state or local
law enforcement officers), § 540A (violent crimes against travelers), § 540B (serial
killings). Department of Justice regulations delegate the authority "to investigate" to
the FBI. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2001).
227.
18 U.S.C. § 3052 (2001). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 3107 (2001) (providing
authority to serve warrants and make seizures pursuant to them); FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(a) & (h) (providing search warrants may be issued upon the request of federal law
enforcement officers so authorized by the Attorney General); 28 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2001)
(providing the necessary authorizations). Various statutes authorize the seizure of
property, and DOJ regulations delegate the power to conduct these seizures to the FBI.
See 28 C.F.R. §§ 8.1, 8.2. DOJ has promulgated a policy on subpoenas, interrogation,
indictment, and arrest of members of the news media, see 28 C.F.R. § 50.10, and
guidelines on obtaining documents from third parties, see 28 C.F.R. pt. 59, but neither
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Apart from these provisions, the powers of federal law enforcement
officials derive from the nature of executive authority, constitutional
restrictions
on investigative
techniques,
general statutory
authorizations for federal law enforcement, common law, and the
enactment of specific criminal statutes. 228 The Department of Justice
has drafted policies to govern some investigative and law
enforcement activities, but the policies create no legal rights and
provide no sanctions for violations. 22 9 In the wake of the September
11 attacks, moreover, DOJ has floated a proposal to relax some of
2 30
those restrictions.
At the state level the picture is more complicated.
The
23
Constitution permits a wide amount of state police discretion. '
Most states, however, have codified at least some procedures for
arrests and the use of force, and many individual police departments

set of provisions creates any enforceable individual rights, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.12(n),
59.6(b).
228. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1543-53 (2001) (relying
on common-law powers of arrest in case involving state police to deny claim that
Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless misdemeanor arrests); United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.) (discussing common law powers
of arrest); John T. Elliff, The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786 (1984); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
416-17 (1819) (implying congressional authority to set sentencing ranges from power to
create federal crimes). Twenty-five years ago, a Senate committee urged the adoption
of "[a] basic law-a charter of powers, duties, and limitations-[for the] FBI's domestic
intelligence," but Congress never acted on the recommendation. SELECT COMM. TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. II, at x (1976); see also Elliff, supra, at 785-86, 81314.
229.
See 28 C.F.R. § 0.17 (authorizing the Office of Investigative Agency Policies to
draft policies on law enforcement activities); Attorney General's Guidelines on General
Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroomI/generalcrimea.htm; Policy Statement: Use of Deadly
Force, at http://www/usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/resolutionl4b.htm; see also Elliff, supra
note 228 (discussing the evolution and non-enforceability of guidelines for FBI
investigations).
230.
David Johnston & Don Van Natta, Jr., Ashcroft Weighs EasingF.B.I Limits
for Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at Al.
231.
The Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions can be read as a
sustained effort to reduce the discretion created by vague statutory authorizations,
particularly at the state level. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming
Crisis of Criminal Procedure,86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998). Suspicion of police discretion
recurs from time to time. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999)
(holding Chicago gang loitering statute gave too much discretion to the police and
refusing to consider police department internal rules that limited discretion); id. at 71
(Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting the statute is unconstitutional on its face "because
the policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case" even if that discretion is used
"wisely"). Just as important as the use of constitutional provisions to restrain police
discretion, however, is what seems to be the corollary that the police otherwise have
discretion to act.
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have drafted policies on a wide range of police practices. 23 2 These
statutes and policies perform a valuable function, but they are
23 3
neither universal nor complete; gaps in coverage persist.
2 34
Moreover, continued unacceptable levels of illegal police violence
suggest that policies on the use of force are not sufficiently
widespread, are not consistently effective, or both. Behind all of this
is the common law, including doctrines of immunity from damages for
235
certain official activities.
In the face of so much discretion, Public Committee suggests that
one way for U.S. courts to restrain state violence is simply to say that
unauthorized government restraints on liberty are unconstitutional.
Absent specific authorization through statutes or binding
regulations, 236 law enforcement authorities could not restrain a
Such a rule would presumably apply against
person's liberty.
nonbinding policies, practices, customs, and individual incidents.
Federal and state courts would enforce the rule through
prohibitory and mandatory injunctions: courts would prohibit the

232.
See Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1552, 1558-60 (listing statutes allowing
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed in officer's presence); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 16-19 & nn.14-20 (listing statutes and policies on use of deadly
force against fleeing suspects); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 50, 50 n.4 (1963) (opinion
of Brennan, J.) (listing statutes requiring police to announce themselves before
entering dwelling); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative
Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth
Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 446, 483-92 (1990) (noting an increase
since 1975 in the promulgation by police departments of written guidelines for
investigative practices and particularly on the use of deadly force). The American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignnent Procedure (1975) proposes a fairly
comprehensive codification of police authority.
233.
See Bandes, supra note 14, at 1278-79 (stating many police departments
lack policies to control police practices, with the result that norms of behavior circulate
unimpeded and encourage illegal violence).
See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. Compare with Kreimer,
234.
supra note 13, at 521 n.232 (suggesting deadly force policies have reduced police
violence).
235.
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 154, at 1781-84; see supra note 228.
236.
I include regulations because so much contemporary lawmaking takes place
as part of the administrative process, and because other writers have noted the
possibility of using administrative law to curb police discretion. See Ronald J. Allen,
The Police and Substantive Rulemaking, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 64-67 (1976) (providing
an overview of this issue); LaFave, supra note 232, at 470-83; Luna, supra note 20, at
1167; see also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 10.3 (1975) (requiring
the promulgation of state and local regulations in addition to statutes); James J. Fyfe,
Terry: A[n Ex-]Cop's View, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1231, 1247 (1998) (advocating clear
policies that define reasonable suspicion and reasonable fear). The distinction between
nonbinding or less than fully binding departmental policies and binding regulations
drafted under an express grant from the legislature is important. The Supreme Court
has used the existence of routine procedures to uphold brief detentions of individuals
and vehicles, as well as inventory searches, although evidence of these "procedures"
often consists of nothing more than an officer's testimony, not actual written and
binding regulations. See LaFave, supra note 232, at 451-63, 470-83.
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or
unauthorized practice and mandate the adoption of statutes 237
regulations as a precondition to resuming the activity at issue.
The remedy thus would differ from a standard institutional reform
injunction, which often takes the form of detailed standards drawn
up by the court and imposed on the government. Not only would a
no-restraint injunction be less intrusive, it would also be less onerous
because it would require governments to do what many already have
begun to do: draft clear policies on the use of violence against
citizens. Finally, some evidence indicates that enforcement of a nouse of
restraint rule, and a corresponding increase in policies on2 the
38
violence.
state
illegal
reduce
would
topics,
force and related
In the course of adapting the Israeli doctrine, I have phrased it
as a negative liberty-freedom from unauthorized restraints-to
reflect the general language of constitutional rights in the United
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
States.
Amendments would be the best sources for a constitutional norestraint doctrine, because lack of legislative or administrative
authorization means that restraints on liberty are by definition
without procedural due process. 239 Importantly, locating the doctrine
in the due process clauses highlights the limited nature of the norestraint principle. Once the process happens-that is, once there is
a law or regulation-the restraint on liberty is permitted unless it
violates some other constitutional doctrine.

The Supreme Court also has limited federal court power to require police
237.
departments to draft policies as a remedy for civil rights violations. See Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976) (relying on federalism concerns to reject federal court
power to require changes in police department "internal procedures"); LaFave, supra
note 232, at 499-501. The no-restraint rule and a loosening of equitable discretion
would thus lead to the demise of this aspect of Rizzo as well as Lyons.
See Kriemer, supra note 13, at 521 n.232.
238.
See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) ("the right of exit is a personal
239.
right included within the word 'liberty' as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that
'liberty' is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the
Congress."). As the source for most excessive force claims, the Fourth Amendment is
also a strong candidate, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), but it fails to
capture the procedural nature of the no-restraint rule. Another source for a norestraint doctrine is federal court supervisory power. See United States v. MattaBallesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 774 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J., concurring). The supervisory
power, however, would have to be stretched to accommodate the no-restraint rule. See
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-47 (1992) (stating the supervisory power
does not allow the creation of rules for institutions separate from the courts); Sara Sun
Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984)
(suggesting use of supervisory power to regulate conduct that occurs prior to litigation
may go beyond federal courts' Article III power); Office of Legal Policy, Report to the
Attorney General on the Judiciary's Use of Supervisory Power to Control Law
Enforcement Activity (Dec. 15, 1986), reprinted in 22 MIcH. J. LEGAL REFORM 773
(1989) (suggesting the same). Classifying the doctrine as supervisory would also bar its
application to state officials. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982).
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The no-restraint doctrine thus resembles clear statement rules of
statutory interpretation. 240 The doctrine also has a strong affinity to
the requirement of First Amendment vagueness doctrine that 'the
law
govern
to
guidelines
minimal
establish
legislature
enforcement.' 241 A full discussion of the possibilities, drawbacks,
and complexities of a no-restraint rule is beyond the scope of this
Article. The following pages, however, consider some examples of the
doctrine's possible scope and limits, beginning with Lyons and
working out to other police conduct and then to potential broader
applications.
If the executive branches of the state and federal governments
have constitutional authority to use against citizens only the violence
that the legislature or regulatory process has specifically authorized
them to use, then the result in a case such as Lyons would be easy.
No legislative body had authorized the widespread use of chokeholds,
and injunctive relief against their use would be appropriate. The
LAPD's materials on chokeholds-which arguably could be construed
as guidelines for its officers-do not satisfy the no-restraint rule
because they were ambiguous and not legally binding on individual
officers or the department. 242 An exception to the rule exists,
however. If an officer were attacked and responded with a chokehold,
that conduct might be excused or justified as a necessity in
subsequent proceedings against the officer, but the burden of proving
necessity should be on the officer and would not be a defense to

240.

Frickey,

See Adler, supra note 146, at 863-74; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.

Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional

Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598-603 (1992).
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen,
241.
415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)); see Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of
Powers in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 415-17, 419-21 (1982).
Professor Neuborne's important article also describes the place of the no-restraint rule
in French constitutional jurisprudence. Id. at 384-86, 392, 395. See also Lord Irvine of

Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and
America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2001) (suggesting the importance of no-restraint
Mark Tushnet recently proposed a
principles to British constitutionalism).
nonconstitutional version of the no-restraint doctrine. MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 163-65 (2000) (describing the rule as an
administrative law ultra vires doctrine). Professor Tushnet's proposal mirrors the
language of the Public Committee court. If the Supreme Court were to scale back its
formal supremacy in constitutional interpretation-as Tushnet also proposes-the
constitutional version of the no-restraint rule might become problematic and his
version might be the best available form for such a rule. Tushnet is unclear, however,
on how this doctrine could be applied by federal courts to state officials. To the extent
his proposal would apply only to federal officials, it is similar to Judge Noonan's
suggested expansion of the supervisory power. See supra note 239. The no-restraint
rule also has links to ideas expressed in Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55
NEB. L. REV. 197, 235-51 (1976), and Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975).
See supra notes 27-31, 47-51 and accompanying text (describing debate on
242.
the scope of the LAPD's chokehold policy).
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injunctive relief. This exception accords with the Public Committee
court's decision to leave open the possibility that coercive
interrogation might be defensible on necessity grounds in after-thefact criminal proceedings. 243 The use of an unauthorized chokehold,
however, would have to be explained and justified on its merits; it
would no longer be the norm.
Compare the situation in Lyons with Tennessee v. Garner and
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista. The no-restraint rule would not apply
in either case because statutes existed that authorized the use of
24 4
deadly force in Garner and the warrantless arrest in Atwater.
Even when the no-restraint rule is satisfied, however, courts would
still consider whether the authorizing statute or regulation is
substantively constitutional. In Garner,the statute failed as applied
because it contravened the substantive requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, 245 while in Atwater the Court found the statute
246
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that many states have adopted statutes and large
numbers of police departments have drafted policies on the use of
force suggests that compliance with the rule in this context would be
neither onerous nor unprecedented-despite the Court's concerns in
Rizzo v. Goode about ordering such policies. 247 In some contexts,
however, the results would be more sweeping. Consider Terry v.
Ohio,248 in which the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment does not prevent police who wish to question an
individual from detaining and then frisking that person for weapons
if they have reasonable suspicion that he or she is armed.
Terry represents the standard constitutional approach to police
power. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren never asked
whether a state or local statute authorized the stop-and-frisk conduct
at issue, although Justice Harlan's concurrence observed that "[o]n
the record before us Ohio has not clothed its policemen with routine
authority to frisk and disarm on suspicion. '249 The Court's analysis,
moreover, took place against the assumption that police officers

243.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see infra note 291. Whether
necessity should be a defense to damages as well as criminal charges is an important
question. Allowing such a defense to damage actions would weaken the claim, but not
allowing it could be too harsh in some cases. One option is to to have the government
undertake the necessity calculus when deciding whether to defend and indemnify the
officer.
244.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 (2001); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1985).

245.
Garner,471 U.S. at 9-12.
246.
Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1557.
247.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-80 (1976).
248.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring). New York adopted a stop and frisk law in
249.
1964-four years before Terry, see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1992)but such guidelines were and are rare, see Fyfe, supra note 236, at 1235-36.
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simply possess the authority to frisk potentially dangerous people,
except to the extent that the Constitution places limits on such
activity. For example, the Court began with the assertion that "[n]o
right is held more sacred ... than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law. '250 Immediately, however, the Court reformulated the idea of
"clear and unquestionable authority of law" into a right under the
Fourth Amendment "to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion."251 The move from a requirement of clear legal authority
for all restraints on freedom to a willingness to accept reasonable
restraints even if not specifically authorized occurs so quickly that it
seems natural. But what has occurred is a move from a requirement
exists except
of positive law to a concession that police authority
252
when specifically restrained by the Constitution.
I am not arguing that police officers should be powerless to
protect themselves from concealed weapons. Under the no-restraint
rule, the Terry frisk is permissible if authorized by law. Moreover, as
Chief Justice Warren said, "it would be unreasonable to require that
police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their
duties."253 Justice Harlan put the matter more plainly, arguing that
"the only satisfactory basis" for affirming Terry's conviction arose
"from the necessity of the situation and not from any broader right to
disarm. '254 In other words, the principle of necessity provides the
reason for police discretion in the absence of express statutory
authority. We cannot reasonably expect the police to act otherwise; of

Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250.
250, 251 (1891)).
251.
Id. (emphasis added).
252.
The Court understood what was at stake when it accepted a baseline of
unauthorized police discretion. "On the one hand," the Court observed, "it is frequently
argued that in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on
city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in
relation to the amount of information they possess." Id. at 10. "On the other side," the
Court recognized, "the argument is made that the authority of the police must be
strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the
traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 11. Rather then resolve
this debate, the Court conceded its powerlessness to "control] the myriad daily
situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street." Id. at 12.
The Court also admitted that allowing the admission of evidence obtained from a stopand-frisk "has the necessary effect of legitimatizing the conduct which produced the
evidence." Id. at 13. And, in fact, Terry holds that a pat-down for weapons before
questioning a suspicious individual is legitimate police conduct so long as the police
officer can "point to specific and articulable facts which ... reasonably warrant that
intrusion." Id. at 21.
253.
Id. at 23.
254.
Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not
Bury Terry, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053, 1062 (1998) (noting "most commentators seem
to endorse" the police safety rationale for frisks based on less than probable cause).
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course they will frisk people whom they wish to question but who
might be armed-but under the no-restraint rule, they would bear
the burden of showing the necessity to engage in illegal activity.
The problem with Terry is that the necessity principle-that
police obviously will act to protect themselves-does not require a
regime in which police discretion is the baseline rule. A baseline rule
that unauthorized police action is illegal and actionable has room for
the necessity principle. These competing approaches each have
strengths and weaknesses. The Public Committee rule enhances
democracy by ensuring that legislatures, or those to whom they
delegate their power, determine the scope of police power to interact
with citizens.
The rule also endorses individual liberty as a
fundamental baseline value that overcomes government claims of
discretion. Yet the Public Committee rule is less flexible and could
prove unworkable in practice, or at least not be as workable in a large
255
urban U.S. city as it might be for the GSS in Israel.
The Terry approach is more flexible and thus might support
efficient crime detection and control. Moreover, the decision as to
what procedures are most appropriate would be left in the first
instance to those who presumably are most expert in assessing law
enforcement needs-although the same would be true under the norestraint rule if the legislature chose to delegate to police officials the
power to craft binding regulations.
Flexibility and efficiency,
however, often come at the expense of individual liberty, and
requiring police officers to articulate their needs to some legislative
or regulatory body would not automatically deprive them of the
necessary tools to carry out their law enforcement duties. Moreover,
leaving the balance between order and liberty in the hands of those
charged with keeping order could well skew the balance. Increasing
discretionary powers and decreasing liberty could lead, not just to
frisks of dangerous suspects, but to pretextual stops and even
violence against those who resist, talk back, or somehow get in the
way. Leaving the scope of discretion in the hands of the police could
25 6
lead, in other words, to Lyons.

255.
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 87 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 ("a rigid and unthinking application of the
exclusionary rule . . . may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to
prevent crime. No judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street
encounter").
256.
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 43
(1997) ("One can only wonder how much of the racial tragedy visited upon Los Angeles
in recent years might have been avoided had the Supreme Court done the right thing in
Lyons and sent a different signal to the LAPD."); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth
Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271, 1320
(1998) (arguing law enforcement discretion reinforces the "biases and prejudices of
individual officers").

20021

ILLEGAL STATE VIOLENCE

A rule of no restraints on individual liberty without statutory
authorization could have implications beyond traditional crime
control activities, but again those implications are not entirely
without precedent. For example, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer 25 7 and Kent v. Dulles258 indicate that the Court has flirted
with constitutional doctrines that could overlap with the no-restraint
rule and limit executive discretion. 259 In Youngstown, the Court
ruled that President Truman's seizure of steel mills was an
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. 2 60 That is to say, in
the absence of constitutional authority to act, the President can
restrain the liberty and property rights of mill owners only if
Congress provides the necessary legislative authorization. In Kent,
the Court relied on Youngstown to hold that the Secretary of State
could not deny passports to U.S. citizens who were also communists
because Congress had not specifically authorized the Secretary to
deny passports on that basis. The Court declared that the right to
exit the country was part of the right to travel "included within the
word 'liberty' as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that 'liberty' is to
be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the
Congress." 261 Almost immediately, however, the Court backed away
from Kent, and the possibility of a meaningful no-restraint rule
26 2
melted away.
Other cases demonstrate the consequences of rejecting the norestraint rule. In In re Debs,26 3 the Supreme Court ruled that the
executive branch had the power to seek and the federal courts to
grant an injunction against a boycott linked to the 1894 Pullman
strike, even though no federal statute had been violated and no
federal statute provided authority to seek or grant injunctions for

257.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
258.
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
259.
See also infra note 286 (discussing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)); cf.
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (striking down a regulation not
explicitly authorized by Congress that barred aliens from federal civil service
employment, in part because such a decision should be made by a different level of the
government).
260.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-89.
Kent, 357 U.S. at 129 (citing Youngstown).
261.
The Court held in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), that the statutory
262.
language which in Kent did not authorize the Secretary of State to deny passports to
communists could nonetheless be read to authorize a blanket ban on travel to Cuba.
The Court distinguished Kent by stressing its First Amendment overtones. Id. at 13;
see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 240-42 (1984). Note, however, that Zemel and
Wald are consistent with the no-restraint rule to the extent (1) they hold that Congress
in fact provided the necessary authorization to the Secretary of State and (2) they
relied on the necessity exception in light of the tensions between the U.S. and Cuba.
Yet the statutory language is far from clear, and the U.S. was not engaged in hostilities
with Cuba. Such low thresholds for satisfying the no-restraint rule and activating the
necessity exception would render the doctrine meaningless.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
263.
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such conduct: The Court reasoned that the Constitution gives
Congress control over interstate commerce and the transportation of
mail, and Congress had exercised its power. 264 "It follows," according
to the Court, "that the national government may prevent any
unlawful and forcible interference" with interstate commerce and the
transportation of mail.

265

Ordinarily, the Court admitted, Congress would "prescribe by
legislation that any interference with these matters shall be offences
against the United States, and prosecuted and punished by
indictment in the proper courts. ' 266 Yet even in the absence of a
statute, the Court insisted that other remedies were available.
Making an analogy to insurrection, the Court declared that the
primary remedy was violence:
The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of
the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the
security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care. The
strong arm of the national government may be put forth to brush away
all obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce or the
transportation of the mails. If the emergency arises, the arms of the
Nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the Nation to compel
26 7
obedience to its laws.

Having established a baseline executive power to use violence to
enforce order even where Congress has not actually created a remedy
or even an offense, the Court asserted that Debs was lucky only to be
enjoined and held in contempt rather than, presumably, maimed or
killed:
[It is more to the price than to the blame of the government, that
instead of determining for itself questions of right and wrong on the
part of these petitioners and their associates and enforcing that
determination by the club of the policeman and the bayonet of the
soldier, it submitted all those questions to the peaceful determination of
268
judicial tribunals ....

So taken was the Court with the violent majesty of the executive
branch that it never considered the possibility that the executive
could-indeed, should-have simply done nothing in the absence of
26 9
relevant federal law.

Id. at 579-81.
264.
Id. at 581.
265.
Id.
266.
267.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
268.
269.
The Court went on to state its holding in more palatable terms: "Every
government, entrusted, by the very terms of its being, with powers and duties to be
exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts
for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other......
Id. at 584. But this language cannot mask the Court's acceptance of discretionary state
violence to suppress any threat to order.
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A court that took the no-restraint rule seriously could not write
such an opinion, objectionable both in its sanctioning of violence
against citizens and in its approval of inherent executive power to
seek equitable relief to restrain citizens who are not breaking any
federal law. Lest we dismiss Debs as a relic of the first era of
"government by injunction,"270 remember that its approval of
discretionary executive power to seek injunctions appears to remain
good law. 27 1 Moreover, while executive power to seek injunctions can
be described as neutral-it can serve or undermine civil rights-Debs
has been limited or questioned by the courts precisely when the
government sought to use it as authority for suing to enforce
individual civil rights and restrain state violence. 272 Put simply,
Debs and its progeny suggest-as, indeed, does Lyons-that we are
lucky when the government submits its claims against troublemakers
to the courts instead of using violent methods that it has every right
to employ.
Here, too, we see the necessity principle at work. Who would
doubt that the federal executive should use violence-or forego
violence and instead seek an injunction-to keep order when
In response to terrorism, for
circumstances warrant its use?
example, the executive branch obviously may use necessary violence
to protect the nation and apprehend the perpetrators. The issue is
how to treat such violence. U.S. courts could apply the no-restraint
rule and refuse to validate the use of violence in advance while
holding out the possibility that it might be justified as necessary after
the fact. U.S. courts could insist that the use of such violence and,
indeed, any expansion of executive discretion be temporary-only
what is necessary and only for as long as required for Congress to act

Charles Noble Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARV. L. REV. 487
270.
(1898).
271.
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 473-75 &
n.13 (1976); Sluys v. Hands, 831 F. Supp. 321, 323 n.1 (1993). See also United
Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 61 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("The crux of the Debs decision, that the Government may invoke judicial
power to abate what is in effect a nuisance detrimental to the public interest, has
remained intact."). But see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 740-48
(1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (asserting the Attorney General lacks statutory
authority to seek prior restraints on publication); id. at 752-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(questioning the authority of the Attorney General to seek prior restraints); infra note
272 and accompanying text. Federal courts may no longer punish contempt summarily.
See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Inherent power to punish contempt,
however, remains. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,
795-96 & n.8 (1987). Congress partially overruled Debs when it limited federal court
power to grant labor injunctions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2001).
272.
United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding
the United States does not have inherent authority to sue to enjoin violations of
individuals' civil rights); id. at 209, 213-18 (Gibbons, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing) (arguing Debs supports such suits); see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying
text (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 14141 and City of Philadelphia).
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on the question of whether to provide or withhold authority to the
executive. But the Debs Court, perhaps seeing the Pullman strike
and associated boycotts as the beginning of the end, endorsed
273
discretionary government violence with all its might.
The perception of necessity and the limits of the no-restraint rule
are also central to the Court's rulings in Hirabayashi v. United
States27 4 and Korematsu v. United States,275 although a version of the
no-restraint rule played a role in Ex parte Endo.276 Korematsu, for
example, was convicted of the crime of knowingly remaining in a
military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive
order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander
designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to
any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any
277
such military commander.

Tracing Korematsu's crime leads to Executive Order 9066, which
declared that for "protection against espionage and against sabotage,"
military commanders could "prescribe military areas ... from which
T
any or all persons may be excluded. 2 78
Specificity is achieved only
with the military proclamations themselves, which imposed curfews
specifically on Japanese Americans, barred them from certain areas,
279
and ultimately ordered them "resettled" into camps.
Thus, Congress did not specifically authorize the relocation of
Japanese Americans to camps, nor did it specifically authorize
curfews to limit their movement. 28 0 Instead, it delegated power to
the Executive branch and in particular to the armed forces. 28 ' If the

273.
My discussion of Debs suggests an affinity between the no-restraint rule
and the liberal model of emergency power. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the
Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989). Under the liberal model, the boundary
between authorized conduct and the requirements of necessity is the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 1388. In other words, the exercise
of emergency power is illegal, unconstitutional, and subject to censure, and the
executive is subject to impeachment and personal liability for any damages-subject to
indemnification by Congress. Id. at 1389-91. Professor Lobel describes how the liberal
model has been undermined by realist approaches to separation of powers and theories
of inherent, constitutional executive power. Id. at 1398-1412. Lobel's analysis also
demonstrates the limits of the no-restraint rule. So long as Congress authorizes the
executive to use emergency powers, the rule is satisfied. Id. at 1408, 1418-21.
Moreover, Congress has a weak commitment to enforcing emergency legislation to limit
executive discretion. Id. at 1412-16. See also infra note 332 (discussing the problem of
commitment).
274.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
275.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
276.
Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); see infra note 286.
277.
Act of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-17.
278.
7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
279.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 227-30 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
280.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 89-91 (1943).
281.
Id. at 91 ("The conclusion is inescapable that Congress, by the Act of March
21, 1942, ratified and confirmed Executive Order No. 9066. And so far as it lawfully
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no-restraint rule applies here-because the delegation was
insufficiently specific and amounted to an abdication of power or
obfuscation of the massive civil rights and liberties violations already
underway-then it is in tension with the ability of Congress to
delegate authority to the executive branch. 28 2 This tension may be a
good thing; the idea of restrictions on legislative ability to delegate
the authority to define when and how physical restraints on
individual liberty can be made is hardly far-fetched. 28 3 While it is
probably unrealistic to forbid all delegations of this nature, the norestraint rule plausibly could require, first, an express delegation
that sets clear parameters for administrative rulemaking, second,
that the law enforcement agency which receives this authority
promulgate binding regulations pursuant to standard administrative
procedures, and third, that the regulations themselves be clear and
28 4
precise.
Even with these requirements, the no-restraint rule would have
been small comfort to Hirabayashi and Korematsu. Congress did

could, Congress authorized and implemented such curfew orders as the commanding
officer should promulgate pursuant to the Executive Order of the President."). The
Court attempted to reframe the question, not as one of delegation, but rather of
whether, "acting in cooperation, Congress and the Executive have constitutional
authority to impose the curfew restriction...
" id. at 91-92-a chilling prelude to
Justice Jackson's later and more famous claim that there are few limits on the power of
the President and Congress acting together. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
282.
For the Court's most recent approval of a broad delegation of power by
Congress to an administrative agency, see Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,
121 S. Ct. 903, 912-14 (2001); see also id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring) (chastising the
majority for its refusal to recognize that the delegated power is "legislative" power);
Bressman, supra note 145, at 1403-08 (providing overview of the development of and
debate over delegation); Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation
Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDoZO L. REV. 731 (1999)
(providing a variety of perspectives on the doctrine). For an insightful argument that
nondelegation ideals are alive and well in the form of statutory construction canons,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Canons].
283.
See Nadine Strossen, Delegation as a Danger to Liberty, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 861 (1999) (arguing application of Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), would
require heightened scrutiny of delegations that restrain individual liberty). Professor
Sunstein draws an explicit connection between this kind of nondelegation doctrine and
the decision in Public Committee. See Sunstein, Canons, supra note 282, at 343 n.123.
284.
See LaFave, supra note 232 (arguing regulations would impose desirable
limits on police discretion, particularly in the Fourth Amendment context); Luna, supra
note 20, at 1167 (arguing for such a result as one way to achieve greater accountability
for and trust in police decisions). On some level, every government action is a restraint
on liberty, with the result that the no-restraint rule could become a strict
nondelegation rule. A sliding scale or the creation of different categories of restraints
would solve the problem, however, by distinguishing physical force used against
natural persons from other trespasses on liberty interests. See Neuborne, supra note
241, at 376 (suggesting that separation of powers judicial review could be limited to
protection of fundamental values).
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delegate authority, and military officials did craft reasonably clear
rules that restrained the liberty of thousands of Japanese
Americans. 28 5 Except as modified by Ex parte Endo's application of
the no-restraint rule to hold that detention was unauthorized once a
citizen's loyalty was established, Hirabayashi and Korematsu had no
claim. 286 Once more we run up against the limit of the no-restraint
rule. Procedurally valid laws or regulations that restrain liberty
satisfy the rule. Substantive limits on the ability to restrain citizens
28 7
must come from some other source.
Examples of the potential impact of a vigorous no-restraint rule
could multiply with each volume of the U.S. reports, but the point is
clear. 288 The United States could follow Israel and adopt some

285.
But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 230-33 (1944) (Roberts,
J., dissenting) (arguing the web of military regulations made compliance with the law
impossible).
286.
Endo challenged the power of military authorities to detain her in a
"relocation center" once she established that she was a loyal citizen. Observing that
"[n]either the Act nor the orders use the language of detention," Endo, 323 U.S. at 30001, the Court determined that detention authority could exist only by implication. "If
there is to be the greatest possible accommodation of the liberties of the citizen with
this war measure, any such implied power must be narrowly confined to the precise
purpose of the evacuation program." Id. at 301-02. Denying that Congress had ratified
the detention of loyal citizens, id. at 303 n.24, Justice Douglas declared,
The authority to detain a citizen or to grant him a conditional release as
protection against espionage or sabotage is exhausted at least when his loyalty
is conceded. If we held that the authority to detain continued thereafter, we
would transform an espionage or sabotage measure into something else.
Id. at 302. The Court ordered Endo's release from detention, id. at 303, although her
liberty to return home remained in question. Id. at 308 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Justice Murphy would have applied a stronger version of the no-restraint rule and a
substantive equal protection right: "I am of the view that detention in Relocation
Centers of persons of Japanese ancestry regardless of loyalty is not only unauthorized
by Congress or the Executive but is another example of the unconstitutional resort to
racism inherent in the entire evacuation program." Id. at 307.
287.
See, e.g., id. (arguing equal protection principles invalidated detention);
LaFave, supra note 232 (noting regulations on police procedures must be consistent
with the Constitution).
288.
For example, in response to the claim that the bombing of Cambodia by
U.S. forces during the Vietnam War was illegal because unauthorized by Congress, a
district court "permanently enjoined ... the Secretary of Defense, the Acting Secretary
of the Air Force, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, from 'participating in any way in
military activities in or over Cambodia or releasing any bombs which may fall in
Cambodia."' Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers)
(quoting the district court's order). The Court of Appeals stayed the injunction, and
Justice Marshall refused to vacate it. Id. The plaintiffs then applied to Justice
Douglas, who entered an order vacating the stay. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S.
1316 (1973) (Douglas, J., in chambers). The Solicitor General then applied to Justice
Marshall for a stay of the injunction, which Justice Marshall granted after consulting
with the rest of the Court, all of whom agreed except for Justice Douglas, who
dissented. Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers);
id. at 1322-26 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed
the case under the political question doctrine and expressed doubts about standing.
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version of a rule that government officials cannot restrain the liberty
of individuals without specific legislative or administrative
authorization.
The limits of the doctrine should also be clear. First, authorized
conduct, even if odious, satisfies the no-restraint rule-although
other doctrines may bar it. Yet the formal and procedural nature of
the rule also takes a significant step toward addressing separation of
powers and federalism concerns about court intrusion on the
executive and sovereign states. 28 9 Second, the necessity principle
could apply as an after-the-fact justification of or excuse for conduct
that violates the no-restraint rule. 290 While difficult to deny in some
form, the necessity principle destabilizes the no-restraint doctrine
291
and risks undermining it entirely.
The limits of the doctrine are troubling, but in the meantime the
Supreme Court of Israel is using the no-restraint rule to prohibit at

Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). The no-restraint rule might not
override the political question doctrine, but the existence of a clear rule preventing
government violence unless authorized by law would alleviate some of the concerns
which animate that doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 226 (1962); see also
supra note 123.
289.
Indeed, this limitation probably explains why the Public Committee court
described its ruling as consistent with and even required by "the principle of
Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law." H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against
Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel (Sept. 6, 1999), available at
http://207.232.15.136/mishpat/html/en/system/index.html, at 25, reprinted in 38 I.L.M.
1471 (1999).
290.
For discussion of classifying necessity as justification or excuse, see Parry,
Virtue, supra note 79, at 442-45, and sources cited therein.
291.
Slobogin, supra note 254, at 1053, 1065 (noting the police safety rationale
for Terry has the "potential for swallowing up the probable cause requirement
entirely"). Public Committee declared that the necessity defense would be appropriate
in the "ticking time bomb" situation, in which a suspect "holds information respecting
the location of a bomb that was set and will imminently explode." Public Committee, at
22. How the GSS will know whether a suspect has such information when any
suspected terrorist could possess it is unclear. In addition, while the court noted the
requirement of imminence, it suggested that harm would be imminent "even if the
bomb is set to explode in a few days, or perhaps even after a few weeks." Id. The
magnitude of the hypothetical potential harm thus controlled the imminence
requirement. See Parry, Virtue, supra note 79, at 401 (arguing "the balance of harms"
is "the centerpiece of the defense-the inquiry around which all else is organized").
Moreover, this relaxation seems almost to serve as guidance for the GSS in future
investigations, and an aggressive reading could produce the rule that any interrogation
of a person suspected of terrorist ties could disclose an imminent harm, which in turn
would justify torture. See Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 141-43 (1978)
(assessing the balance of harms argument); see supra note 79 (citing articles from an
Israel Law Review symposium that address the necessity issue); see also Mandel, supra
note 83, at 313 n.168 ("since the decision did not order anything but a formal change, it
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the court's main goal ... was not to stop torture
but rather to legitimate it"); John T. Parry, Resisting Complicity: JudicialResponses to
State Violence in the United States and Israel, in THEIR DEEDS WERE EVIL:
UNDERSTANDING ATROCITY, FEROCITY AND EXTREME CRIMES (Diana Medlicott ed.,
forthcoming 2002) (discussing this problem) [hereinafter Parry, Resisting Complicity].
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least some forms of unauthorized state violence and protect
individuals from harm.2 92 Moreover, the breadth of these limits will
itself depend upon whether courts can use binding judicial review to
293
impose other substantive restraints on government action.

292.
Amnesty International has stated that "the GSS ceased systematic use of
these interrogation techniques." Amnesty International, Torture in Israel: Amnesty
International Oral Statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights Concerning
Israel and the Occupied Territories (March 2000), at http://www.angelfire.comia/
palestinefoeverlamnestytorture.html. Amnesty and other groups, however, claim that
torture still occurs. See Elizabeth Olson, Israel Denies Groups' Charge that It Is
Torturing Detainees,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at A10. See also Israel's Shin Bet Still
Tortures Despite Court Ban, Report Says, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 6, 2000
(describing report by the Public Committee Against Torture which admits a dramatic
drop in claims of torture but contends the GSS has worked to bypass the court's
decision). Reports of torture and ill treatment since Public Committee are usually
unsubstantiated. See U.S. Dep't of State, Occupied Territories: Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 6
(2000), at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt
2000/nea/index.cfm?docid=882; U.S. Department of State, Israel: Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 3 (2000), at http.www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/
index.cfm?docid=794. See also Elizabeth Olson, Citing Some Progress, U.N. Panel on
Torture Urges Israel to Take More Steps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A8. In at least
one substantiated incident, seven Israeli policemen are facing charges, which might not
have happened before Public Committee. Joel Greenberg, Charges in Beating of
Palestinian,N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2001, at A6. The aggressive response of the Israeli
government to the current intifada raises the possibility that any continuing risk of
torture arises as much from regular army forces as from the GSS. See Olson, U.N.
Panel, supra (noting an increase in allegations of mistreatment "as fighting intensified
over the past year").
293.
International law norms are also relevant to controlling illegal state
violence, but several difficulties limit their usefulness in the United States. The
Senate frequently ratifies treaties with reservations that limit their scope and bar
private rights of action in U.S. courts-as it has done with the treaties that litigants
would be most likely to invoke in this context. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of
Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 34648 (1995). Even without such reservations, courts are reluctant to find a private right
of action. See Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 147, 155 (1999). Nor are courts likely to use customary international law to
restrain or compensate for domestic executive action. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 837, 837 n.150 (1997), Luna & Sylvester,
supra, at 165-71. Finally, the utility of international law for restraining illegal state
violence in the United States may be limited. International law has little to say about
the availability of or the conditions for providing equitable relief as a remedy, see Note,
Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federaland State Governments,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1269, 1275-76, 1283 (1991), and torture and other forms of
degrading treatment are already illegal here, see supra note 223. In sum, international
law might best play a role in developing a stronger baseline position against
government discretion to engage in illegal violence and could serve as an important
source for criticism of government actions and court decisions.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DOCTRINAL CHANGE IN ISRAEL AND THE
UNITED STATES

This Article's focus so far has been on the specific doctrinal
differences between the United States and Israel with respect to
standing, equitable discretion, and the validity of unauthorized
restraints on liberty. At the same time, I have also suggested that
the differences between Lyons and Public Committee could derive
from a deeper source: the different roles of courts in Israel and the
United States. More specifically, the Supreme.,Court of Israel's
willingness to take a relaxed view of standing, to decide the merits
based on a general principle of individual liberty, and to restrain the
government is linked to the court's relative lack of formal power as
compared to the U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme
Court's restricted view of standing and remedies and its relatively
permissive view of police discretion are linked to its formal
supremacy. The question then is whether the United States could
move closer to Israeli doctrines without also moving closer to the
Israeli model of judicial review.
Instead of a comprehensive constitution, Israel has a series of
basic laws adopted by the Knesset. 294 If no basic law applies to a
particular case, background principles of individual liberty may
forbid government action that has no statutory authorization. 295 The
Knesset, however, retains power to fill the void and authorize state
action that contradicts these background rights. 296 "[I]n the absence
of express provisions granting them preference status," moreover,
"basic laws are not inherently superior to ordinary legislation," and
"the Knesset may amend a provision in a basic" law by ordinary
legislation passed with a simple majority. '297
Some basic laws
contain "entrenchment" provisions that make it harder-but not
impossible-for the Knesset to enact changes. 298 The Knesset thus
can modify the documents that are intended to be Israel's
29 9
constitution.

294.
See supra note 91.
295.
H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel
(Sept. 6, 1999), available at http://207.232.15.136/mishpat/htm1/en/system/index.html,
at 11-12, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999); David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on
Human Rights, in PUBLIc LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 130, at 141, 143; see supra notes
221-22 and accompanying text.
296.
Kretzmer, supra note 295, at 141, 143.
297.
Id. at 144; see Dorner, supra note 91, at 1328.
298.
Dorner, supra note 91, at 1329-30; Kretzmer, supra note 295, at 145-46.
299.
EDELMAN, supra note 91, at 43. This power is not just theoretical. In 1993,
the court held that the government's refusal to allow importation of non-Kosher meat
violated the entrenched Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In response, the Knesset
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As a result, the Supreme Court of Israel's rulings are not final
statements of what the law is. Public Committee's references to
separation of powers and the Knesset's ability to authorize torture
were simple descriptions of Israel's political structure.3 0 0 Yet the
court's lack of formal power need not lead to real weakness, as Public
Committee shows. To the contrary, many believe that lack of finality
30
has freed the court to articulate an expansive conception of rights. '
As Gary Jacobsohn explains:
[A]n activist judiciary functioning in a political context that is
structurally and philosophically opposed to the doctrine of judicial
finality is not as vulnerable to the sort of criticism [i.e.,
countermajoritarian concerns] that regularly surfaces in polities, such
as the American, where the doctrine has been more readily assimilated
30 2
into the nation's constitutional culture.

One might say the court has taken advantage of its freedom to
303
propose anything but to conclude nothing.
The court's formal power of judicial review has expanded since
the adoption in 1992 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, although it is still not as
extensive as U.S.-style judicial review.3 0 4 While some herald these
basic laws as Israel's bill of rights, 30 5 others claim the court has

amended the Basic Law to allow its modification by ordinary legislation passed by a
majority of the Knesset. A majority then passed a statute barring the importation of
non-Kosher meat, and the court upheld it. Hirschl, Revolution, supra note 222, at 44243; Hofnung, supranote 91, at 596-97.
300.
Public Committee, at 25-26.
301.
Aharon Barak, Freedom of Speech in Israel: The Impact of the American
Constitution, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 241, 247 (1985); Robert A. Burt, Inventing
JudicialReview: Israel and America, 10 CARDOzO L. REV. 2013, 2022-23 (1989).
302.
GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL
AND THE UNITED STATES 150 (1993). See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing the countermajoritarian difficulty in the United States).
303.
Cf. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 253 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (Madison) (reporting the comments of James Wilson on the
freedom of delegates to the constitutional convention); id. at 266 (King) (reporting the
same).
304.
The Supreme Court of Israel has begun to consider whether legislation
enacted after the passage of these basic laws conforms to their requirements of
consistency with the values of the state, a proper purpose, and only minimal
infringement. Gelpe, supra note 91, at 510-11. The court has also asserted its power to
review statutes for conformity with any provision of the basic laws, whether entrenched
or not. Id. at 513-21. For a general discussion of these issues from the perspective of
administrative law-and thus to some extent of the no-restraint rule-see Baruch
Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rights in Israel: The Impact on
Administrative Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581 (2001).
305.
Aharon Barak, Chamishim Shamot Mishpat B'Yisrael [Fifty Years of Law
in Israel], 16 ALPAYIM 36, 39 (1998) (stating the new basic laws turned Israel "from a
parliamentary into a constitutional democracy"), translated and quoted in Orna BenNaftali & Sean S. Gleichgevitch, Missing in Legal Action: Lebanese Hostages in Israel,
41 HAR. INT'L L.J. 185, 207 (2000); Hirschl, Struggle, supra note 91, at 96-97.
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become more timid as its power has grown. 30 6 Moreover, the court's
30 7
growing power has generated criticism of its role in Israeli society.
These criticisms could lead to self-imposed restraints on the court's
power, including restrictions on standing. 30 8 Because the Knesset
has the last word, they could also lead to legislative revision of the
judiciary's functions.
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that its rulings
are final and binding and that it alone has the ultimate power to
interpret the Constitution. 30 9 When Congress has attempted to
substitute its own interpretation of the Constitution for that of the
Court, the Court has responded with indignation. 3 10 In other words,
31
although there are limits to its interpretive and practical power, '
the U.S. Supreme Court takes its name seriously.
Just as the Supreme Court of Israel's lack of supremacy may
play a role in decisions such as Public Committee, so too the U.S.
Supreme Court's formal supremacy may have played a large role in
its development of doctrines such as standing. The assertion of

Mandel, supra note 83, at 302-07.
306.
307.
Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216
.(1999); Gelpe, supra note 91, at 494 n.2; see supra note 130.
308.
Gavison, supra note 307, at 233-34; Gelpe, supra note 91.
309.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-21 (1997); Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219, 227 (1995); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. See also Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326
310.
(2000) (responding with less indignation but equal effect). Of course, Congress can
dissolve a federal court's continuing decree by changing the underlying law. See Miller
v. French, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 2257-59 (2000); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232. But if the
underlying law is the Constitution, Congress has no power to modify it. Boerne, 521
U.S. 507. The picture becomes a bit murkier when we remember that Congress may
alter the available remedies for constitutional claims. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing damages action based directly on
the Constitution), with Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (refusing to allow
Bivens action in military context where statutory remedies were available). See also
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996) (holding remedies
created by Congress can displace the doctrine of Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
Altering remedies can easily be understood as altering the right itself. Barry
Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 735 (1992); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) [hereinafter Levinson, Rights Essentialism].
311.
The political question doctrine gives Congress the last word in some areas,
see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), and Congress can overrule the Court's
dormant commerce clause decisions, see Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison,520 U.S. 564, 572 (1997). Moreover, Congress's power to define remedies for
constitutional violations inevitably influences the meaning of the underlying rights.
Friedman, supra note 310; Levinson, Rights Essentialism, supra note 310. See also
Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 674-80 (1983) (arguing
resistance to remedies can result in narrower definitions of rights and that it is
impossible to bifurcate rights and remedies). Interpretive power, finally, does not
always translate into the power to get things done. See BICKEL, supra note 302, at 25470 (2d ed. 1986) (describing resistance to Brown); Burt, supra note 301, at 2093-94
(noting Congress and the states have significant ability to resist the Court).
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supremacy may have made the Court acutely conscious of its power,
and this consciousness may in turn have nourished the fear that
using this power too much could undermine the Court's legitimacy.
In Richardson v. United States, for example, Justice Powell declared
in an influential concurring opinion that "[r]elaxation of standing
requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power"
and argued that "public confidence [in the judiciary]. . . may well
erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our
power to negative the actions of the other branches. '3 12 Three pages
later, he again stressed restraint and limited standing as necessary
by-products of judicial supremacy:
The power recognized in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), is a
potent one. Its prudent use seems to me incompatible with unlimited
notions of taxpayer and citizen standing. Were we to utilize this power
as indiscriminately as is now being urged, we may witness efforts by
313
the representative branches drastically to curb its use.

Justice Rehnquist echoed these concerns in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separationof Church and State, Inc.:
While the exercise of that 'ultimate and supreme function' [of judicial
review] is a formidable means of vindicating individual rights, when
employed unwisely or unnecessarily it is also the ultimate threat to the
continued effectiveness of the federal courts in performing that role
[and] has been recognized as a tool of last resort on the part of the
314
federal judiciary throughout its 200 years of existence.

Turning to the question of standing, Justice Rehnquist asserted that
"[t]he importance of this precondition should not be underestimated
as a means of 'defining the role assigned to the judiciary in a
tripartite allocation of power.' ' 315 To at least some Justices, in short,

312.
Richardson v. United States, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
313.
Id. at 191.
314.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982).
315.
Id. at 474. See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-77
(1992) (claiming standing is so fundamental to separation of powers and the proper role
of courts that Congress cannot expand it to encompass a general interest in proper
enforcement of the law); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (stating standing
"is perhaps the most important" of "[t]he case-or-controversy doctrines [that] state
fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government," and
asserting standing questions "must be answered by reference to the Art. III notion that
federal courts may exercise power only 'in the last resort, and as a necessity,' and only
when adjudication is 'consistent with a system of separated powers'); BICKEL, supra
note 302, at 114-15, 117 (contending justiciability doctrines make judicial review an
"acceptable process" and thus are "necessary supports" for it); JACOBSOHN, supra note
302, at 168 (stressing the link between justiciability and judicial supremacy); Bendor,
supra note 130, at 348-49 (suggesting courts are afraid too broad an intrusion into the
workings of other branches will cause the other branches to limit court jurisdiction or
erode public trust); Meltzer, supra note 64, at 281-82; Pushaw, supra note 66 (linking a
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the familiar separation of powers rationale for standing is not just
about respecting majoritarian decisionmaking or the need for
flexibility in executing the laws. Separation of powers also restrains
the use of judicial power in order to protect the judiciary from the
other branches.
The Supreme Court's efforts to insulate itself from reprisals have
consequences for litigants. The doctrines of restraint created by the
Court in cases such as Lyons limit remedies for reasons that trace
back at least as much to the problem of judicial supremacy as to the
equities of the case or more general concerns about judicial
The
The consequences may go even deeper.
competence. 316
countermajoritarian difficulty did not apply directly in Lyons because
chokeholds had been neither authorized nor validated by any elected,
representative body. 317 The lack of a democratic warrant for the
official violence makes the Court's acquiescence in Lyons more
significant and more troubling. Faced with actions that had little
connection to the democratic process, the Court still allowed concerns
about using federal judicial power to paralyze it in the face of state
violence. Seen in this way, the justiciability- and federalism-based
restraints articulated by the Court in Lyons do not rest on respect for
the states as democratic sovereigns exercising a majority will, but
rather on respect for state power, even if that power is undemocratic
and in tension with individual federal rights.
In short, doctrines of federalism and standing-as well as rules
about the separation of powers and the availability of equitable
relief-may have dual functions. On the one hand, these doctrines
serve straightforward substantive goals, such as the proper allocation
of judicial, legislative, and executive power. At the same time, these
doctrines also function as self-imposed and overlapping limits on the
318
Court's ability to exercise the power it claims to possess.

limited conception of judicial review to more relaxed ideas of justiciability in the early
republic); Winter, supra note 54, at 388-93.
BICKEL, supra note 302, at 114-15, 117.
316.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-36; see also Adler, supra note 146, at
317.
(arguing decisions by administrative bodies present less of a
806-74
countermajoritarian difficulty); Cover, Nomos, supra note 64, at 57 n.158 (arguing the
same); Kramer, supra note 143, at 372 (questioning the assumption that legislatures
are more representative than courts and noting that administrative bodies craft many
of the specific rules that govern our conduct). Countermajoritarian concerns might be
more appropriate during the crafting of relief, to ensure that courts do not coerce
legislators directly and instead allow flexibility in complying with an injunction. See
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990); supra note 173 and accompanying text
(discussing factors courts should consider in the exercise of equitable discretion).
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 154, at 1787-91 (arguing the availability
318.
of constitutional remedies should be measured against two principles: individual
redress and ensuring government faithfulness, to the law in ways consistent with the
separation of powers); Nichol, Abusing, supra note 140 (arguing standing doctrine
reflects concerns about the role and power of the federal judiciary).
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Moreover, the Court's concerns about exercising its power plainly
affect the substantive scope of these doctrines. Indeed, the impact of
these concerns on substantive doctrine-their ability to limit the
right of citizens to be free from illegal state violence-is my concern
here.
I do not mean to suggest that the existence of these dual
functions is automatically bad. To the contrary, if the Court seeks to
preserve its ability to wield the vast power of final and supreme
constitutional interpretation, then some version of these dualfunctioning doctrines is probably necessary. 3 19 As Justice Powell
suggested, if the Court were too free with its power, it would quickly
forfeit its capital of legitimacy and become locked in a power struggle
with the other branches and with the states-a struggle it would
almost certainly lose. 320 Absent the cooperation of the executive and
legislature-the institutions on whom courts depend for enforcement
3 21
and resources-courts run the risk of becoming powerless.
If activism and supremacy are in tension with each other, U.S.
courts may have difficulty adopting the doctrines of Public Committee
to their full extent without sacrificing judicial supremacy. One
alternative is to accept current doctrine as the best equilibrium
position and give up on more expansive approaches. The nation's
persistent problems with police violence and general government
discretion to restrict individual liberty make this option difficult to
accept, however.
A second alternative draws on the possibility that one way out of
the countermajoritarian difficulty is not to be restrained, but simply
not to be supreme. Mark Tushnet, for example, has recently urged
that the Court give up its final interpretive power over the
Constitution.322 If, following Tushnet, the Court were less worried

319.
BICKEL, supra note 302, at 114-15, 117; Gelpe, supra note 91 (arguing the
Supreme Court of Israel may have to develop such doctrines to maintain legitimacy as
its power grows).
320.
Richardson v. United States, 418 U.S. 166, 191 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
321.
Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.
L. REV. 179, 200 (1985) (claiming judges play "a deference game" to allay fears of
attacks on their legitimacy and position); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,Jurisdictionas
Injury: Transforming the Meaningof Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1011-15 (2000)
(discussing the vulnerability of a bureaucratized federal judiciary to congressional
micromanagement and noting judicial anxiety about complaints that they are too
independent and should be called to account for unpopular decisions).
322.
TUSHNET, supra note 241. In addition, Robert Burt has argued that the
Court should not see its task as the provision of final and definitive resolutions of social
conflicts. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992). Abandoning a

court-centered perspective, Michael Paulsen has argued that the executive branch
already possesses the authority to decide for itself what the Constitution and federal
statutes require.

See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive

Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). To my mind, however, he
succeeds only in proving the existence but not the legitimacy of this power. For other
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about formal supremacy, the power-limiting function zof the various
doctrines I have mentioned would be less necessary and limits on
individual remedies in constitutional cases might be relaxed.
Concerns about court intrusion on the executive branch or on the
states would diminish to the extent Congress could restrike the
balance when it disagreed with a decision. 323 Aggrieved individuals
could seek relief for constitutional violations, including injunctions
against state and federal governments, and the reasons for denying
such relief would come from the facts of the case and traditional
doctrines of equity rather than from a collateral interest in
maintaining supremacy. 324 Under this approach, an individual in
Lyons's situation would have standing to seek prohibitory and
mandatory injunctions against similar unconstitutional future
violence.
Yet with this option, the cure might be worse than the
disease. 325 There is no assurance that scrapping or even relaxing the
Supreme Court's formal supremacy would lead to better substantive
results for citizens seeking protection from illegal state violence.
Absent their formal power, U.S. courts might not turn in a more
activist direction. Many judges would feel more exposed to political
reprisal and so would not act. Other judges would have no interest in
activism on behalf of individual rights, whether or not the Court is
supreme.
Moreover, U.S. society and legal culture are different from
Israel's, and those differences might be crucial ingredients in Israel's
ability to have a rights-enhancing judiciary without judicial
supremacy. 326 Nor is it entirely clear as a matter of law or social fact
that Israel's system is as rights-enhancing as Public Committee

recent proposals to limit the Court's power of judicial review, see Mark A. Graber, The
Law Professoras Populist, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2000) (collecting citations).
My assumption here is some greater degree of congressional power to
323.
participate in the definition of constitutional rights, but not an erosion in federal
supremacy.

Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96

(1920) ("I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to
declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could
not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states.").
See supra text accompanying note 173 (listing factors important to
324.
equitable discretion). These factors are not free of concern about the power of supreme
federal courts, and it is difficult to distinguish standard equitable concerns from
judicial supremacy concerns in the Court's statements about equitable relief. See, e.g.,
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). Absent this
second concern, however, the decision whether to grant equitable relief could more
easily develop in an expansive, relief-promoting direction. See Fallon, Public Law,
supra note 7, at 43-47 (discussing how equity could function if freed from justiciability).
Not to mention that the proposal is unrealistic. See Richard Posner, Appeal
325.
and Consent, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1999, at 36.
Cf. Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the
326.
Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1993).
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makes it appear. 3 27 Indeed, the Knesset presumably has the power,
not just to authorize restraints on liberty, but to abolish the Israeli
version of the no-restraint rule.
Perhaps that is why many
commentators keep searching for Israel's own Marbury v.
Madison.3 2 8 Too many factors are in play for us to focus only on
formal judicial power, despite its importance to the results in Lyons
3 29
and Public Committee.

In earlier torture cases, the Supreme Court of Israel was far more
327.
deferential to the GSS, despite the same lack of authorization for torture. See infra
note 85. Other landmark decisions by the Supreme Court of Israel have upheld the
rights of Palestinians, see Hirschl, Revolution, supra note 222, at 446-47; Ronen
Shamir, "Landmark Cases" and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel's
High Court of Justice, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 781, 786-94 (1990), but the court has not
applied these decisions consistently in subsequent cases, which creates the possibility
that their influence on actual legal rights or declared public policies has been limited.
Compare Hirschl, Revolution, supra note 222, at 446-47 (arguing the court has failed to
protect human rights sufficiently and its decisions merely legitimate an unacceptable
system), Mandel, supra note 83, at 309-15 (arguing the same), and Shamir, supra, at
786-94 (arguing the same), with George E. Bisharat, Courting Justice? Legitimation in
Lawyering Under Israeli Occupation, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 349, 373-79 (1995)
(concluding the rare Palestinian victories have an impact on the government's conduct),
Burt, supra note 301, at 2085 (arguing "the prospect of judicial review has apparently
induced caution and meticulous observance of procedural regularity by the military
authorities"), and Dotan, supra note 101, at 357-58 (suggesting the court has achieved
desirable outcomes by setting in motion "a complicated legal apparatus of constant
negotiations, bureaucratic maneuvering, and legal decisionmaking over which the
Court presided"). In addition, the court's treatment of the necessity defense raises
troubling questions. See supra note 291. Finally, the ongoing violence between Israel
and Palestinians-including the current intifada and the government's reactions to itundermine the possibility of developing doctrines that would provide equal protection
to all who live under Israeli power. Put more bluntly, an African American living in
Los Angeles is probably safer under current U.S. doctrine than is a Palestinian living
in Israel under current Israeli doctrine.
328.
At least three cases have been given that designation so far. See, e.g.,
JACOBSOHN, supra note 302, at 113, 124 (discussing Bergman v. Minister of Finance,
23(1) P.D. 693 (1969), and Kol Halamn v. Minister of the Interior, 7(2) P.D. 871 (1953));
Burt, supra note 301, at 2045-47, 2066-76 (comparing Bergman to Marbury and
comparing Dweikat v. Government of Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1 (1979), to Dred Scott); Hirschl,
Revolution, supra note 222, at 447 (noting United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal
Cooperative Village, 49(4) P.D. 195 (1995), "was described by scholars as the Israeli
Marbury v. Madison"); Tushnet, Universal, supra note 222, at 1334 (describing Kol
Ha'am as "Israel's equivalent of Marbury v. Madison").
329.
Ending the Court's power of final judicial review could also destroy the
equilibrium between self-government and the rule of law that can be said to
characterize our judicial system. Michelman, supra note 144; see also NOMOS XXXVI:
THE RULE OF LAW (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (providing broad discussion of the tensions
and commonalities between ideals of democracy and ideals of the rule of law); THE
RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987)
(same). To some extent, of course, this objection simply restates the proposal, which
obviously would entail fundamental change in U.S. constitutional structure, but it
nonetheless reminds us not to rush to resolve a countermajoritarian difficulty that may
be no difficulty at all. Still another objection is that announced supremacy may serve
as a deterrent to legislators contemplating action that comes close to constitutional
boundaries. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
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The third alternative is to seek improvements in doctrine
Even if judicial supremacy
without fundamental restructuring.
stands in the way of the most desirable option-simply adopting
something close to the doctrines of Public Committee as quickly as
possible-the United States is not forced to choose between
revolution and the status quo. To a large extent, law itself is a
process of continued incremental change, which suggests that the
most realistic way to achieve the doctrines of Public Committee is
Rather than announce a
through an incremental approach. 33 0
sweeping no-restraint rule, the Court could begin to apply a norestraint principle in the circumstances of individual cases. Over
time, the decisions would create a broadly applicable doctrine. As
change occurred, moreover, courts could keep an eye out for
resistance from the states and political branches and adjust the pace
of doctrinal movement.
The incremental approach meshes nicely with the no-restraint
rule, which is itself an incremental doctrine. The no-restraint rule
does not command a specific content for government policies that
authorize the use of violence; it merely requires that such
authorization exist. Incremental application of the no-restraint rule
might also forestall the possibility that expansive standing could lead
to curtailment of substantive rights-a possibility that in turn
supports the claim that expanded standing is bad because a more
restricted class of plaintiffs might gain more complete relief.33 1 The
possibility of a complex interaction among doctrines provides a
reason to prefer, or at least accept, an incremental approach lest
3 32
every step forward in one area lead to a step back in another.

853, 888, 888 n.221 (1991). Of course, judicial review may discourage legislators from
giving full consideration to constitutional issues. See Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation,110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1366-

68 (1997); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155-56 (1893). See also Neal Devins,
Reanimator: Mark Tushnet and the Second Coming of the Imperial Presidency, 34 U.
RICH. L. REV. 359, 362-66 (2000) (describing the debate over whether judicial review
encourages legislators to defer constitutional questions or take them more seriously).
For comments on and additional objections to Tushnet's proposal, see the Richmond
Law Review's symposium on Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts, 34 U. RICH.
L. REV. 359 (2000).
330.
I have drawn this paragraph from the following discussions of legal and
constitutional change: Burt, supra note 301; EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING

(1949);

CASS R. SUNSTEIN,

ONE CASE AT A TIME:

JUDICIAL

MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); Friedman, supra note 309; Meyer, supra
note 196; Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1179, 1193-94 (1999); Sunstein, Canons, supra note 282.
Jeffries, Praise,supra note 179, at 78-81; Karlan, supra note 195, at 1338;
331.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism,supra note 310, at 914-15.
To ensure that incremental change continues on the path toward the
332.
doctrines of Public Committee and to make those doctrines stick in the face of settled
approaches and traditions of restraint and deference to law enforcement discretion,
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CONCLUSION

Lyons and Public Committee present different doctrinal
approaches to illegal state violence. Both cases also reflect the very
different assumptions about judicial review that underlie the U.S.
and Israeli constitutional orders. Indeed, I have explored the
possibility that the Supreme Court of Israel is better able to restrain
state violence precisely because it does not have the last word on
Israeli constitutional norms. But the court's formal power is not the
whole story. The court's actions ultimately are part of a dialogue
between the court and the Knesset over the proper scope of executive
authority, and the Knesset has been willing to spell out the authority
that it wants the GSS to have in response to the requirements of
Israeli administrative law doctrines.
By contrast, although the U.S. Supreme Court's claims of
supremacy contribute to an undesirable level of restraint in the face
of state violence, we should not simply assume that these claims are
the root of the problem. The fault also lies with Congress and state
legislatures, which have failed to draft comprehensive legislative
charters for law enforcement agencies. As a consequence, there is
less structure within which to have a meaningful dialogue over the
proper scope of authority for law enforcement officials. Federal
courts instead have sought to create outer limits for the exercise of
police power from the prohibitions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. The resulting doctrines include important protections
for individual rights but also leave too much room for police

courts and individual judges must be committed to change. Cover, Nomos, supra note
64, at 49; Koniak, supra note 205, at 1461. Commitment springs from many sources.
Some judges are committed to particular doctrines or to changes in doctrine because of
pre-existing political loyalties. See Fallon, Ideologies, supra note 155, at 1146-47
(exploring the possibility that judges invoke federalist or nationalist models of federal
courts law based on political predilections). Judges with strong views may be able to
convince wavering colleagues through the force of persuasion and personality. Judges
may also derive commitment from their particular jurisprudential outlook. Mark J.
Osiel, Dialogue with Dictators:Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil, 20 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 481 (1995). Another way to instill commitment is to convince judges that
they are complicit in the state violence they fail to confront. For example, recognition
of its past complicity in GSS torture may explain the Supreme Court of Israel's decision
to switch course in Public Committee and ban torture. See Mandel, supra note 83, at
313 n.168 (noting one commentator has described Public Committee as "an act of
repentance"); infra note 85 (noting the court's awareness of criticism); see also United
States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 774 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J., concurring)
(arguing federal courts are complicit in the efforts of law enforcement officials to
apprehend suspects and must therefore oversee those practices); Laurie L. Levenson,
Unnerving the Judges: JudicialResponsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 787 (2001) (arguing judges have a share of responsibility for the LAPD's recent
scandals because their actions increased the chances that police perjury would
succeed).
For a more extended treatment of these issues, see Parry, Resisting
Complicity, supra note 291.
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discretion even as they often fail to provide clear guidance to law
enforcement officials and raise countermajoritarian concerns.
The United States does not have to change its fundamental
system of separation of powers in order to create a structure that
would enhance judicial control of state violence and that might also
maintain and even encourage democratic accountability. All U.S.
courts have to do is take the ideas of no-restraint and nondelegation
more seriously in the context of police activities while adopting more
flexible doctrines of standing and equitable discretion. Using the Due
Process Clauses, courts should demand that law enforcement entities
act only pursuant to the terms of an explicit legislative charter. Once
such a charter exists, courts can confront issues of state violence as a
matter of statutory interpretation-has the legislature authorized or
delegated the power to authorize the conduct?-rather than
exclusively as a matter of constitutional doctrine. Legislatures could
respond to court decisions by modifying the statutory framework for
law enforcement activities-always subject, of course, to the more
amorphous substantive restraints of the Constitution. As a result,
courts and legislatures might develop a dialogue on issues of state
violence, and the tension between individual rights and majority rule
could lessen as judges and legislators seek practical solutions to the
problem of police authority.
In the end, Public Committee is something more than a mere
doctrinal template. Recognizing its responsibility for past failures to
stop torture, the Supreme Court of Israel used administrative law to
stop the GSS's pervasive violations of human rights. From this
decision, U.S. courts can draw a lesson in doctrine but also, and more
importantly, a recognition of their inevitable responsibility for
protecting individuals from illegal state violence.
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